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ABSTRACT 
 
Two Essays on Mutual Fund Regulations 
 
Maneesh L. Chhabria 
 
 
 
 
In Essay I, I examine whether investment managers of equity mutual funds engage 
in “Window Dressing”.  In setting portfolio holdings disclosure rules, the SEC intends 
to balance the investors’ interest in more frequent portfolio holdings disclosure and 
the direct as well as indirect costs associated with such disclosure. I examine the 
effect of the regulatory framework, rules regarding market structure and 
institutional practices on “Window Dressing”.  The empirical analysis provides 
evidence that “Window Dressing” does not exist on any systematic basis across 
equity mutual funds. The analysis also shows that the current set of rules and 
regulation provide sufficient checks and balances to deter window dressing on a 
systematic basis. 
 
In Essay II, I investigate whether current rules regarding delay in disclosure 
adequately protect mutual fund investors’ interest. Ever since the Investment 
Company Act of 1940 mandated portfolio holdings disclosure, the SEC has tried to 
strike a balance between investors’ interest in portfolio holding disclosure and the 
costs which are ultimately borne by investors. This essay also looks at whether the 
delay in disclosure could  be reduced from 60 to 30 days. The analysis provides 
xii 
 
 
strong evidence that a 60-day delay for portfolio holdings disclosure provides the 
appropriate balance between the desire of investors for transparent and timely 
disclosure and the cost incurred by making that information available to investors. 
The evidence also strongly suggests that a 30-day delay in disclosure is not in the 
best interests of mutual fund investors.    
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ESSAY I: Window Dressing: Fiction or Fact? 
Maneesh L. Chhabria 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations 
regarding fund holdings disclosure is to provide transparent, timely, and accurate 
information to investors. The regulatory focus on disclosure requirements can be 
traced back to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”), as amended. 
From its inception, the 1940 Act required that every mutual fund provide 
semiannual reports to its shareholders1 that, among other things, include a list 
showing the amounts and values of securities owned by the fund at the end of the 
applicable reporting period. Over time the SEC has tried to refine the regulation, 
and, as a result, the rules have evolved. Currently mutual funds are required to 
provide holdings information on a quarterly basis. The latest revision of holdings 
disclosure rules took place in 2004. All disclosure provisions share a common 
feature: that material information concerning our markets must be accurate and 
accessible to all investors.  
 
With their regulations, the SEC intends to strike an optimal balance between the 
investors’ interest in more frequent portfolio holdings disclosure and the cost 
                                                 
1 Section 30 of the 1940 Act 
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associated with making and disclosing the holdings information available to 
investors. The SEC also recognizes the possibility that expanded disclosure of 
holdings information could allow greater opportunity for professional traders to 
exploit information by engaging in predatory trading practices. 
 
Despite all the regulations on holdings information disclosure, fund managers can 
engage in practices that go against the spirit of the rules without violating the letter 
of the law. Window dressing is one such behavior. Window dressing is the technique 
where investment managers sell stocks that have underperformed and buy stocks 
that have outperformed immediately before disclosure with the intent of misleading 
investors. Window dressing also encourages fund managers to do more frequent 
trades than they would normally do.  Higher frequency of trades makes investors 
bear higher transaction costs, and eventually, ends up hurting investors’ return.   In 
addition, window dressing may generate negative tax consequences, since these 
sales would be taxed at short term a capital gain that is higher than long term capital 
gain.  In sum, window dressing would hurt investors’ wealth rather than provide 
economic benefits to investors.       
 
Window dressing has been the subject of many academic studies. Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991) examined the portfolio strategies of 769 pension 
funds and found evidence to support the presence of window dressing. Haugen and 
Lakonishok (1988) argued that the reason for window dressing by institutional 
investors is the turn-of-the-year effect; the relatively high average stock returns 
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around the year-end. Chevalier and Ellison (1997) also supported the turn-of-the-
year effect based on portfolio holdings of growth and growth and income funds. 
Along the same line of argument, He, Ng, and Wang (2004) showed that banks, life 
insurance companies, mutual funds, and investment advisors present trading 
strategies based on window dressing when they act as external managers.  
 
Few articles acknowledge the significance of the regulatory checks and balances 
that restrict a fund managers’ ability to window-dress their portfolio without being 
caught. The regulatory framework of the investment management industry, the 
fiduciary responsibilities expected from fund managers, and the very detailed trade-
settlement process all provide a layer of oversight on fund managers’ activities. 
From an institutional investor’s perspective, the ability of custodian to provide them 
with trade by trade information on fund managers on a daily basis provides a 
significant check on fund manager activity.   
 
In this paper I investigate whether there is quantitative evidence of window 
dressing by examining fund holdings data covering more than 3,000 equity mutual 
funds during the time period from 1995 to 2004. I find no statistically significant 
evidence to support the existence of systematic window dressing. Rather I find that 
funds get rid of poorly performing stocks during any quarter, and that they do not 
seem to engage in window dressing at any particular time of the year. 
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The rest of the paper commences with a review of disclosure regulations as well as 
the previous literature related to mutual fund holdings disclosure requirements and 
window dressing. Section III contains a discussion of the data and methodology, and 
Section IV contains my empirical results. Lastly, I offer conclusions and propose 
some directions for further research. 
 
 
2. Regulations and Literature review 
 
2.1. Evolution of Disclosure Regulations 
 
Section 30(e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 states that mutual funds must 
disclose semiannually to their investors a list of the securities they hold. SEC rule 
30b1-1 provides more specific information about the various regulatory obligations 
of mutual fund companies. Funds must file N-30D reports at the end of each fiscal 
semiannual period, disclosing the complete portfolio holdings for each individual 
fund they manage. In 2003 the SEC passed new rules that required all mutual fund 
and investment management companies to disclose their holdings on form N-CSR 
and form CSRS, which are used for annual and semi-annual reports respectively. The 
SEC issued updated rules in May of 2004 to require that mutual funds use Form N-Q 
to file electronic quarterly holdings data. The new rules mandate that the data be 
filed no later than 60 days after the end of the quarter. 
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In making these new regulations, the SEC was responding to several arguments 
made by the petitioners. First, petitioners asserted that increasing the frequency of 
funds’ portfolio disclosure would allow investors to better monitor the extent to 
which their funds’ portfolios overlap, thereby helping investors make more 
informed decisions about asset allocation. Second, petitioners argued that more 
frequent disclosure would expose "style drift"—when the actual portfolio holdings 
of a fund deviate from its stated investment objective—and would provide investors 
with more information about how a fund is complying with its stated investment 
objective. Third, petitioners pointed out that more frequent disclosure would help 
reveal, and perhaps prevent, two forms of portfolio manipulation: (1) "window 
dressing," which is buying or selling portfolio securities shortly before the date on 
which the fund's holdings are to be publicly disclosed, in order to convey the 
impression that the manager has been investing in companies that have had 
exceptional performance during the reporting period, and (2) "portfolio pumping," 
which is buying shares of stock the fund already owns on the last day of the 
reporting period, in order to drive up the price of the stocks and inflate the fund's 
performance results.2 
 
These SEC recent rules built upon existing rules about holdings disclosure. The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provided the foundation, and Congress amended 
this act in 1975 to include the current version of section 13(f). Under that section, an 
investment manager who exercises investment discretion with respect to accounts 
                                                 
2 For further details http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8393.htm#IIB 
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holding certain equity securities having an aggregate fair market value of $100 
million or more must file quarterly reports of those holdings on Form 13F.3 One of 
the primary purposes behind Section 13(f) when it was enacted was to create a 
central repository of information at the Commission about the investment activities 
of institutional investment managers. This repository of information was intended 
to help regulatory agencies analyze the abovementioned managers’ impact on the 
securities markets as well as the public policy implications of these managers’ 
investment activities4. In addition, Congress expressly intended to increase the 
public availability of information regarding the purchase, sale, and holdings of 
securities by institutional investors.  
 
Investors, whether institutional or retail, are part of the pool of investors in mutual 
funds. Some institutional investors might have a preference for separate accounts, 
but they can also invest in mutual funds. Investors of different types might have 
divergent perspectives on mutual funds because of the various share classes that 
they use to invest in the fund. Generally a mutual fund will have multiple share 
classes with varying minimum investment sizes and related fees. Needless to say, a 
larger minimum investment means lower fees. But in spite of having various share 
classes, the underlying fund remains the same for all investors and the return 
differential between the various share classes is a function of the varying fee 
structures rather than varying strategies. Given this industry structure, from a legal 
                                                 
3 For further details http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/13fpt2.htm 
4 For further details see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14852, at 5 (June 15, 1978) (Adopting 
Release). 
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point of view, the degree of care required for investment decisions remains the 
same irrespective of the type of investor. 
 
Managers of mutual funds have particular obligations to their investors. Public 
pension funds and private pension funds managed under defined benefit plans or 
defined contribution plans all fall under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA). This law specifically aims to ensure that the investment 
manager and the custodian are fiduciaries.  
 
The intent of the various sections covered under these various laws is to directly 
reduce the incentives to engage in any activities which would be detrimental to the 
interests of investors. These laws aim to discourage many activities including 
window dressing. For further details of the various sections of the law please refer 
to Appendix A. 
  
 
In addition to the ERISA rules, the Investment Company Institute also publishes a 
guide for mutual fund directors to help them understand their obligations and 
restrictions. When it comes to portfolio compliance, the guide is straightforward: “as 
part of its overall ‘watchdog’ role, the board of directors must monitor the 
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investment company’s compliance with investment policies and restrictions.”5 
Failure on the part of the fund to comply with legal and prospectus restrictions can 
lead to legal liability for the directors themselves. In actuality, a fund’s directors 
engage the manager, the custodian, or another entity to carry out the operational 
steps involved in compliance monitoring, while they retain ultimate responsibility. 
 
In sum, all the various laws as well as the Investment Company Institute guidelines 
definitely provide enough disincentives to engage in Window Dressing.   
 
As a complement to the legal framework that defines the overall role of investment 
managers, there is an entire separate set of laws that touches on the day-to-day 
activities of investment managers, custodians, and investors. For the purpose of my 
discussion I will refer to the framework around day-to-day activities as “Market 
Structure”. 
 
2.2.  Market Structure 
 
Custodians play a very important role in the day-to-day activities of investment 
managers, whether they are managing money on behalf of institutional investors or 
retail investors. The custodians’ role vis-à-vis investment manager remains 
consistent irrespective of investment vehicles used or investors.  
 
                                                 
5 Investment Company Institute, Introductory Guide for Investment Company Directors, 1995. 
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<Insert Figure 1> 
The 1940 Act gives mutual funds several options for maintaining custody of their 
securities, but nearly all U.S. mutual funds today use independent banks as 
custodians.  The custodian holds the fund’s securities in safekeeping and manages 
the cash movements involved in settling trades and income payments.  
 
< Insert Figure 2> 
 
The custodian maintains both cash and securities accounts at each of the 
depositories. The securities account contains all the securities held by mutual funds 
and other clients of that custodian. The cash account is used to move money to and 
from the depository in the settlement of trades and other transactions, such as 
dividend and interest payments. When the exchange-listed stock trade settles, the 
depository moves money from the cash account of the buying custodian (or broker) 
to the cash account of the selling custodian (or broker), and changes its ownership 
records by adding to the buying custodian’s security account and subtracting from 
the selling account.  
 
Every time an investment manager decides to buy or sell any security, irrespective 
of the exchange where the transaction occurs, it triggers a series of interactions 
among several parties that eventually results in the buyer of the security getting 
10 
 
 
ownership and the seller getting cash. Collectively, this chain of events constitutes 
the trade settlement process. 
 
In addition custodians routinely provide sophisticated analytical services to their 
investors. They do not need to provide the fund manager with the details of these 
services and thus this sophisticated process implies that the custodians can build an 
extra layer of oversight in the system, which reduces manager’s incentives to engage 
in window dressing.  In other word, it is not feasible for mutual fund managers to 
execute buy/see orders without going through the custodians and leaving a 
permanent paper trail.  This entire process provides a significant deterrent to fund 
managers who intend to engage in window dressing.  Even though the managers can 
engage in window dressing, they would not be able to get away with it.  Further 
details of market structure are described in Appendix A. 
 
< Insert Figure.3> 
 
 
2.3.  Literature Review 
 
Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler and Vishny (1991) were the first to examine the 
phenomenon of window dressing. They investigated the portfolios of 769 equity 
pension funds that they obtained from a fund evaluation service. Their data set 
contained, for each pension fund, the complete equity portfolio holdings at the end 
of each quarter from 1985 to 1989. On the basis of 20 quarters’ worth of data they 
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confirmed the existence of the window dressing. Lakonishok et al. (1991) found that 
both sales and purchases of recent losers are relatively high in the fourth quarter, 
and they took the sales as evidence of window dressing.  
 
Musto (1999) provided evidence that even money market funds hold 
disproportionately more government securities just before disclosure dates, and 
fewer just afterwards. They performed a test by comparing the semi-annual 
portfolios that investors can observe with those that they cannot observe over the 
period from November 1987 to July 1997. They found evidence of window dressing 
even though the sample is biased towards funds that do not mind increased 
disclosure, which suggests that these funds are those that would window dress 
relatively less. 
 
Using the same technique created by Lakonishok et al. (1991), He, Ng and Wang 
(2004) conducted an examination of 13(f) holdings data from March of 1986 to 
September of 1998. He et al. (2004) classified institutions that manage funds on 
behalf of their customers—like banks, life insurance companies, mutual funds, and 
investment advisors—as “external money managers” and those that self-manage 
their own money—like property and liability insurance companies, pension funds, 
colleges, universities and foundations—as “internal money managers”. They 
concluded that institutions that invest assets externally on behalf of their clients 
have a greater tendency to window-dress their portfolios at the time of disclosure 
than do institutions whose assets are primarily managed internally. 
12 
 
 
 
One important point—often ignored—is that a lot of the money managed by 
external money managers is actually provided by the internal money managers. 
Pension managers and university endowments do not manage all of their 
investments internally. They choose to retain some portion of their assets to 
manage internally while the rest is given to different asset managers under different 
mandates. According to a study by Healey and Rozenov (Journal of Investing, 
summer 2004), the amount of pension assets managed internally during the 1990s 
fell from 43% to less than 33% by the end of the decade. So more than 60% of the 
assets of these internal money managers is managed by external money managers 
and will show up in 13F filings as such. 
 
Studies on “Window Dressing” have rested on the assumption that investors must 
wait for regulatory disclosure before they know what their holdings are. They 
ignored the active presence of directed trustees who are in touch with plan 
sponsors and who provide the funds for these external money managers. However, 
this assumption does not reflect the reality of disclosure regulations. Since 
investment management is primarily conducted within the bounds of the law, one 
must consider the effect of ERISA laws as well as the rules within which the entire 
market structure operates. Both these sets of rules would suggest that any 
institutional investors would be able to obtain detailed information on their 
investments through their custodians without waiting for regulatory disclosure, 
much less the approval of an investment manager.  
13 
 
 
 
One way that holdings data can be disseminated without relying on the investment 
manager is through rating firms such as Morningstar and Lipper. Mutual funds have 
been very willing to work with these rating agencies and provide them with 
holdings data more frequently than they have to disclose under current regulations. 
Since funds benefit from obtaining higher ratings from these agencies, these firms 
have been able to obtain holdings data even on a monthly basis for many funds. A 
study as far back as 1995, reported in both the Boston Globe and The Wall Street 
Journal,6 found that 97% of the money flowing into no-load equity funds between 
January and August 1995 was invested in funds that were rated as five- or four star 
funds by Morningstar, while funds with less than three stars suffered a net outflow 
of funds during the same period. Moreover, the heavy use of Morningstar ratings in 
mutual fund advertising even today suggests that mutual fund companies believe 
that investors care about Morningstar ratings. Many academic studies, including 
Khorana and Nelling (1998) and Blake and Morey (2000), have examined the 
predictive abilities of Morningstar ratings service and found favorable results. Del 
Guercio and Tkac (2002), Bergstresser and Poterba (2002), and Ivkovic and 
Weisbenner (2006) all have found that Morningstar ratings are significantly related 
to fund flow. These rating firms—whose entire business model revolves around 
rating mutual funds on their attributes—have a keen self-interest in making sure 
                                                 
6 CharlesJaffe, "Rating the Raters: Flaws Found in Each Service," Boston Globe, Aug. 27, 1995, 
p. 78. The same survey was also reported by Karen Damato, "Morningstar Edges Toward One-
YearRatings," The Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1996. 
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that they are not assigning high rating to funds that indulge in mischief such as 
window dressing. 
 
In this paper, I will build on the existing literature by examining the possibility of 
window dressing using mutual fund holdings data while taking into account the 
various institutional features of the marketplace. This allows a closer examination of 
the holdings data to better infer investment manager intent vis-à-vis using 13F 
data—which is at best aggregate data across various fund families and separate 
accounts—or using aggregate pension fund equity holdings data that would include 
equity holdings of multiple equity manager with varying mandates. My focus is to 
look for existence of window dressing at all points of regulatory disclosure, and to 
find evidence of it on a systematic basis. 
 
 
3. Data and Methodology 
 
3.1.  Data 
 
The analysis is based on equity mutual funds holdings data provided to Morningstar 
on a quarterly or monthly basis between 1995 and 2004. All the funds in this 
dataset are actively managed funds that track the S&P 500 Index. I exclude index 
funds from our analysis because their composition is transparent to the market on a 
daily basis. 
15 
 
 
 
Equity mutual funds that are benchmarked to the S&P 500 Index comprise a 
significant portion of investors’ portfolios and may represent the majority of the 
market. This study focuses on equity mutual funds that are benchmarked to the S&P 
500 Index in order to avoid possible issues with funds that track different 
benchmarks. Funds based on the small-cap indices or sector-focused indices would 
have different holdings profiles and may not be representative of the broader 
market. For example, real estate–focused funds would own completely different 
stocks than would a broad market fund because differences in portfolio composition 
are primarily driven by differences in the benchmarks that the funds use.  
 
In the dataset, there a total of 3,809 unique funds for which portfolio holdings data 
are available. . The total market cap of all funds in the dataset is 59.4% of the total 
net assets invested in equity funds in 2004.  The proportion of equity funds in the 
Morningstar dataset has increased over time as more funds started providing 
Morningstar with their holdings information.  In this study, I do not include index 
funds that use S&P index as benchmark as well as funds that use other types of 
indexes as benchmarks.  Since the data were provided to Morningstar by the funds 
on a voluntary basis, the holdings for all funds are not available consistently across 
every time period. Some funds provided portfolio holdings data on a quarterly basis, 
for example, while others provided portfolio holdings data on a monthly basis.  
 
<Insert Table 1> 
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The average lifespan of a fund in the full dataset is 5.63 years, smaller than the time 
frame of this study. In this study I focus on those funds for which holdings data are 
available not only for the end of each quarter but also for one month before and 
after the end of each quarter. This allows me to examine whether the nature of 
holdings changes in months when disclosure is generally not provided. It is 
important acknowledge that, from a regulatory perspective, the funds are only 
required to disclose their holdings data twice a year, not on a quarterly basis. 
However, most of the funds voluntarily disclosed their holdings information on 
quarterly basis during the sample time period.  
 
Table 2 shows that a significant number of funds provided holdings data not just for 
the end of quarter but also for one month before and after the end of each quarter. 
For Quarter 1, nearly 2,016 funds provided holdings data for the months of 
February, March, and April. Similarly I see that, for ‘Quarter 2, nearly 2,043 funds 
provided data of similar quality. I also see that the average lifespan is around 6 
years for funds that provided holdings data for one month before and after the end 
of the quarter. Panel A of Table 2 shows the increasing number of funds that 
provided their holdings information regularly to the ratings firm, which represents 
the growth in the industry. In total, there are nearly 19,838 fund-quarters’ of data.  
 
<Insert Table 2> 
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As one of contributions of this study, I use holdings data for months in addition to 
the data for quarter-ends. If window dressing exists for a quarter-end, then for the 
month after the quarter-end the buying and selling behavior of funds would be 
materially different than the behavior for the quarter-end. In other words, if fund 
managers window-dress during quarter-ends, then in the next month they would 
have to unwind their less risky trades and reverse their behavior. By looking at both 
quarter-end months as well as Quarter End + 1 month data, I can examine whether 
window dressing behavior exists. 
 
3.2.  Trade Activity Measures 
 
I use an approach similar to the one used by Lakonishok et al. (1991) for measuring 
trading activity. I make a few changes to their approach to make the analysis more 
robust.   
 
In the first step, I classify stocks based on their return performance. NYSE stocks are 
used to determine the breakpoints for five quintiles at the end of each quarter, and 
these divisions are applied to all NYSE, American, and NASDAQ stocks. The quintiles 
are primarily based on stock returns over the past year (i.e., one year prior to the 
end of the quarter). This procedure is repeated every quarter; therefore, the 
composition of each quintile also changes every quarter. Second, I calculate the 
amount each fund historically holds, buys, and sells each quarter, and each fund’s 
distribution across the various stock quintiles over time. Finally, I compare and 
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contrast fund activities as a percentage of Total Universe Holdings as well as Total 
Fund Holdings. 
 
Aggregate Buying / Selling Measure: 
 
As explained above, the stocks are segregated into quintiles and each fund is 
examined to calculate how much each manager buys and sells every quarter from 
each quintile. To calculate these distributions, I create a measure of “Selling 
Intensity” and another of “Buying Intensity”. 
 
The sale of stock in performance quintile i during a quarter j by each fund k is 
measured by  
 
      (1)   
 
Equation (1) is called “Selling Intensity” and it shows the ratio of sales in a 
performance quintile to holdings of the same stocks at the end of the previous 
quarter, divided by the ratio of total sales in the current quarter to holdings at the 
end of the previous quarter. The value for both SELL and HOLD are calculated using 
the average of the beginning and end of the quarter j prices. “Selling Intensity,” since 
it is calculated as a ratio, adjusts for the fact that funds might be selling less in a 
particular quintile at a particular time only because they are selling less of 
everything else. 
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Similarly, the purchase of stock in performance quintile i during a quarter j by each 
fund k is measured by  
 
      (2) 
 
Equation [2] is called “Buying Intensity” and it shows the fraction a fund buys in a 
performance quintile relative to the fraction of the universe holdings in the same 
performance quintile. The value for both SELL and HOLD are calculated using the 
average of the beginning and end of the quarter j prices. Also UNIV.HOLD is based 
on value of the CRSP universe in quarter j in quintile i. “Buying Intensity” also scales 
all fund purchases.  
 
I first calculate the “Buying Intensity” and “Selling Intensity” measure for each fund, 
and then aggregate the measures across funds and years for each quarter. Finally, I 
find the average over quarters 1 through 3 and compare that average to the one for 
quarter 4.   
 
 
4. Empirical Results  
 
Window dressing is a technique where investment managers sell stocks that have 
underperformed and buy stocks that have outperformed immediately prior to the 
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disclosure of their holdings information to investors, thereby misleading investors 
about the true holdings information. Evidence of window dressing might be found, 
then, either in (1) the type of stocks that are bought and sold around disclosure or in 
(2) the amount of buying and selling that occurs around disclosure. I present the 
results of my tests of these phenomena below. 
 
4.1.   What Do Funds Buy/Sell/Hold: An Aggregate View 
 
In this section I examine whether fund holdings are materially different from 
universe holdings across performance quintiles. I examine data for both funds with 
“Quarter End” holdings and “Quarter End +1” holdings data to see if the distribution 
changes between these two times.   
 
In Table 3 shows the overall proportions of stock portfolios in various quintiles that 
funds hold as a whole. The quintiles are based on return performance over the past 
year. Fund holdings, sales, and purchases in Table 3 are calculated by a method 
slightly different from the one Lakonishok et al. (1991) used. Lakonishok et al. 
(1991) measured these as if the money were in one aggregate fund. The following 
example illustrates the effect of this assumption. Suppose there are two funds, A and 
B, that both own stock X in quarter 1. Fund A owns 100 shares and fund B owns 50 
shares. If fund A sells 50 shares while fund B purchases 50 shares in the same 
quarter, the net effect would not show up because everything is calculated as though 
all the money was in one aggregate fund.  In other words, at quarter 2 (i.e., before 
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the transactions), the total number of shares owned for stock X is 150 shares (i.e., 
100 by fund A + 50 by fund B = 150 shares in total).  Even at quarter 2 (i.e., after the 
transactions), total number of shares owned for stock X stay the same, 150 shares 
(i.e., 50 by fund A + 100 by fund B = 150 shares in total). In sum, focusing on net 
change in total number of shares held on an aggregate level leads to 
underrepresentation of the total amount of buying and selling. In this study I avoid 
the problem of underrepresentation by calculating changes in the holdings data on 
the fund level first, and then aggregating the value over the quarters and the years.  
 
<Insert Table 3> 
 
In Table 3 the “Sales as % of Total Sales” in Quintile 2 fall from 19% (Panel A) to 
16% (Panel B), while they increase in Quintile 5 from 21% (Panel A) to 30% (Panel 
B). There is significant variation in how “Sales as % of Total Sales” are distributed 
across various quintiles between Panel A and Panel B. “Purchases as % of Total 
Purchases” also change materially between Panel A and Panel B.  
 
Panel B of Table 3 shows that funds in the sample hold only 5 percent of their 
portfolio in extreme losers for “Quarter End” holdings, compared to 7 percent for 
the universe. This suggests that the funds are underrepresented in extreme losers. 
On the other hand, funds hold 29 percent of their portfolio in extreme winners, 
compared to 24 percent for the universe. One reason why funds are 
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overrepresented in extreme winners might be that the funds are chasing past 
performers in general. 
 
Table 4 has the same variables used in Table 3 but applies them to holdings data for 
the month following quarter ends (i.e., the “Quarter End +1” holdings data issued for 
the months of April, July, September, and January). Here the funds hold 5 percent of 
their portfolio in extreme losers, compared to 7 percent for the universe, as shown 
in Panel B of Table 4. The funds hold 29 percent of their portfolio in extreme 
winners, compared to 24 percent for the universe. So the proportions are the same 
for “Quarter End” data and for “Quarter End +1” data. 
 
<Insert Table 4> 
 
This evidence does not support the window dressing thesis. If window dressing 
were to exist, funds would exhibit different holdings patterns across various 
performance quintiles at “Quarter End” than they would at “Quarter End +1”. In 
particular, one would expect that the “Sales as % of Total Sales” for extreme winners 
would be higher for “Quarter End +1” holdings compared to “Quarter End” holdings 
if window dressing were taking place because funds would be selling down their 
holdings of winners after disclosure at the end of the quarter. When comparing 
Panels B of Tables 3 and 4, however, the data do not show this pattern. “Sales as % 
of Total Sales” for extreme winners are 28% in Table 4 while they are 30% in Table 
3. Thus funds are selling less in non-disclosure months than in quarter-end months, 
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which is not in line with behavior that I would expect for window dressing. Thus I 
do not find any indication of window dressing in the results of the performance 
quintile test. 
 
4.2.  Do “Buying Intensity” and “Selling Intensity” of funds signal 
window dressing? 
 
In this section, I look for evidence of window dressing by analyzing trading intensity 
measures for funds. Because of the patterns of buying and selling inherent in 
window dressing, the “Quarter End +1” month disclosure should look materially 
different from the “Quarter End” disclosure and should present some of reversal of 
window dressing in the measure of trading intensity. Therefore, I examine both 
“Buying Intensity” and “Selling Intensity” of funds at “Quarter End” and “Quarter 
End +1” to see if there is any evidence of window dressing. 
 
Panel B of Table 5 shows that during Quarter 1 funds over-buy extreme winners 
(i.e., the highest performing stocks in Quintile 5) with a ratio of 1.82, and they over-
sell extreme losers (i.e., the lowest performing stocks in Quintiles 1 & 2) with the 
ratio of 1.18. This indicates that funds are selling losers and buying winners prior to 
disclosure. I find similar behavior across all four quarter-end disclosures.  
 
< Insert Table 5> 
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If funds engaged in window dressing they would exhibit sharp reversals in trading 
intensity measures, specifically for extreme winners and extreme losers in the 
month following disclosure.  
Given that they bought extreme winners in Quarter 1(Quarter End), for them to 
window dress they should not extreme winners in Quarter 1 (Quarter End +1), but 
in Panel B of Table 6, the funds over-buy extreme winners (ratio of 1.93). This does 
not support the possibility of window dressing. We also see in Panel B of Table 6 
(“Quarter End +1” holdings), that  funds over-buy extreme winners (ratio of 1.95) 
and over-sell extreme losers (ratio of 1.15) following Quarter 4, with similar 
behavior across all four “Quarter End +1” disclosures. This result does not support 
the hypothesis that funds engage in window dressing. 
 
Panels B of both Tables 5 and 6 display fund behavior with respect to “Buying 
Intensity” and “Selling Intensity” of extreme winners and extreme losers that is 
inconsistent with the window dressing hypothesis. 
 
Given the significantly greater amount of scrutiny that is to be expected of year-end 
holdings, I examine if the “Selling Intensity” measure of Quarters 1–3 are different 
from Quarter 4. Panel A of Table 5 shows that the “Selling Intensity” of extreme 
losers in Quarter 4 (ratio of 1.17) is not statistically different from the average of the 
“Selling Intensity” in Quarters 1–3 (ratio of 1.22). The fund sale of extreme losers in 
Quarter 4 is no different from other quarters, and therefore this measure provides 
no evidence of window dressing. In other words, funds are willing to get rid of those 
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extreme losers in any given quarter and do not show any propensity to do more of 
that activity in Quarter 4 vis-à-vis other quarters. Panel A of Table 6 shows similar 
results in terms of “Selling Intensity”. “Selling Intensity” of extreme losers in Quarter 
4 (ratio of 1.15) is not statistically different than the average of Quarters 1–3 (ratio 
of 1.2). Tables 5 and 6 show patterns in the “Quarter End” disclosure as well as in 
the “Quarter End +1” disclosure that do not support the window dressing 
hypothesis. 
 
I also examine whether the average “Buying Intensity” of extreme winners in 
Quarters 1–3 is different than the average in Quarter 4.  I find that buying of extreme 
winners does not accelerate in Quarter 4 compared to the other quarters (i.e., 
Quarter 1, Quarter 2, and Quarter 3), which ultimately does not support the window 
dressing hypothesis.  Panel A of Table 5 shows that the “Buying Intensity” of 
extreme winners in Quarter 4 (ratio of 1.61) is lower than the average of Quarters 
1–3 (ratio of 1.70) and the difference is statistically significant.  In Table 6 Panel B, I 
examine the “Buying Intensity” of extreme winners in Quarter 4 (ratio of 1.95) that 
is higher than the buying intensity of the other quarters.  These evidences not only 
rule out the presence of window dressing, but indicate that funds managers 
continue to buy extreme winners irrespective of month of holdings disclosure.  In 
other words, the fund managers do chase momentum.    
 
< Insert Table 6> 
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4.3.  Robustness Tests 
 
Holdings disclosure by mutual funds at the end of the second and the fourth quarter 
was primarily driven by regulations in place before these new changes in 2004. Also 
the end of year filing would be the most optimal quarter to engage in window 
dressing given the expectation that investors pay more attention to mutual funds at 
the year end. Thus one would expect to possibly find evidence of window dressing 
at the end of year. But we find that funds over buy extreme winners at end of the 
second quarter compared to end of year. I also find that funds undersell extreme 
winners in “quarter end+1” in quarter four compared to quarter two. Both these 
results suggest that just at year end mutual do not engage in window dressing. 
  
Many portfolio management teams either directly or indirectly run multiple funds 
which are sold either the fund company name or under some other distribution 
method.  What this means is that there are not as many fund management teams as 
many funds which are sold in the market place. Thus if one team which manages a 
strategy sold under multiple names, the effect of window dressing would show in 
the aggregate data in a meaningful manner. But it is not possible to easily ascertain 
who actually manages a fund over time given that this information is not readily 
available. This also reduces the incentive to engage in window dressing. 
 
Fund flows would also have an impact on fund holdings but there is no publicly 
available source of information which tracks fund flows on a fund level basis. Since 
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fund flows are primarily beyond the control of fund managers one would not expect 
to see any material aggregate effect which would possibly mask window dressing.  
Also even if a fund manager wanted to engage in window dressing there is no way 
for the manager to influence fund flows. Thus there is no reason to believe that 
there would be any sustained and directional impact of fund flows on window 
dressing. 
  
 
5. Conclusions  
 
Window dressing is a technique whereby investment managers mislead investors at 
the time of disclosure by selling stocks that have underperformed and buying stocks 
that have outperformed immediately before the time of disclosure. Prior studies on 
window dressing have rarely looked at the regulatory aspect of this alleged activity. 
Given that Congress and the SEC have mandated mutual fund disclosure regimes to 
help investors make better investment decisions, the presence of window dressing 
would defeat the intent of those regulatory policies. Thus both investors and 
regulators would benefit from having a better understanding of window dressing.  
 
This study attempts to find systematic evidence of window dressing by examining 
fund holdings data. The holdings data covers more than 3,000 equity mutual funds 
during the time period from 1995 to 2004. I examine holdings data for months when 
holdings disclosure was mandated and also for months when holdings disclosure 
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was voluntary. Overall, I conclude that there is no significant evidence of window 
dressing in this sample of funds holdings information. I do not wish to assert that no 
fund engages in window dressing, but rather that on a systematic basis there is no 
statistically significant evidence to suggest such activity. 
 
The legal and regulatory framework within which the investment management 
industry exists certainly restrains the behavior of fund managers. The fiduciary 
responsibilities expected from fund managers and the very detailed trade 
settlement process provide a layer of oversight on fund managers’ activities.  From 
an institutional investor’s perspective, the ability of a custodian to provide them 
with trade-by-trade information about fund managers provides a significant check 
on fund manager activity.  Through these checks and balances, a fund manager’s 
attempt to window-dress their portfolio is not likely to go unnoticed.  It is also 
interesting to point out that a number of funds have already provided holdings 
information disclosures with greater frequency than the minimum requirement by 
law; holdings disclosure twice a year7. 
 
With such a multi-layered framework of oversight, perhaps it is not surprising that 
the data do not show evidence of systematic window dressing.  However as 
summarized here, this paper suggests that there is no significant evidence to 
support systematic presence of the window dressing.   
 
                                                 
7 Since June 2004, the required disclosure has become on a quarterly basis. 
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The first piece of the analysis investigates whether the fund holdings are materially 
different from universe holdings across performance quintiles based on “Quarter 
End” holdings and “Quarter End +1” holdings data. No material change is evident in 
their percent holdings of extreme winners and extreme losers from “Quarter End” 
holdings to “Quarter End +1” holdings. Instead, both “Quarter End” holdings and 
“Quarter End +1” holdings are consistently overrepresented in extreme winners, 
which indicates that funds are chasing past superior performers. These results do 
not indicate presence of systematic window dressing. 
 
The second piece of the analysis examines funds’ patterns of buying and selling. 
Under the assumption of window dressing, one would expect that the sales of 
extreme losers would be higher at “Quarter End” compared to “Quarter End +1” 
because the fund would be selling down its holdings of losers prior to disclosure at 
the end of the quarter. One would also expect that the sales of extreme winners 
would be higher at “Quarter End +1” compared to “Quarter End” because the fund 
would be selling down its holdings of winners after disclosure at the end of the 
quarter. However, the data show no material change in the sales of extreme losers 
between “Quarter End” and “Quarter End +1” holdings data, and sales of extreme 
winners are in fact lowed at “Quarter End +1” than at “Quarter End”. These results 
do not support the existence of window dressing either. 
 
The final piece of the analysis examines the measure of “Buying Intensity” and 
“Selling Intensity,” with a specific focus on the holdings data for the fourth quarter. I 
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find that the funds over-buy extreme winners and over-sell extreme losers in the 
fourth quarter. This would seem to indicate the possibility of window dressing; 
however, I find that funds show this same behavior across all “Quarter-End” and 
“Quarter End +1” holdings data.. Funds are willing to over-buy extreme winners 
during the first three quarters even more so than in the fourth quarter. I also 
observe that even in “Quarter End+1” holdings data we can see that funds over-buy 
extreme winners. Thus funds on an aggregate basis seem to be influenced by the 
momentum in the market and do not show any systematic tendency toward window 
dressing.  
 
Hence the impact of change in disclosure rules is that funds providing holdings 
disclosure only twice a year will need to provide their holdings information four 
times a year.  It would ensure that all funds provide holdings information on a 
consistent and timely basis.  Given that we do not find any systematic evidence of 
window dressing when the required number of holdings information disclosure was 
only twice a year, the increase in the number of disclosure will further reduce the 
incentive to engage in window dressing. 
 
In summary, the combination of quantitative evidence and a closer examination of 
the legal framework under which the investment management industry operates 
leads me to conclude that window dressing is not widely prevalent across the 
industry. 
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Figure 1. Custodians’ role 
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Figure 2. The relationships among issuers of securities, depositories, 
custodians, and funds 
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Figure 3. Settlement Process 
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Table 1. "+1 -1" month funds for complete dataset 
       The table reports the number of funds that disclose portfolio holdings at the end of each quarter, one month 
before the quarter end, and one month after the quarter end.  "Quarter 1" denotes the number of funds that have 
holdings information at the end of February, March, and April.  "Quarter 2" denotes the number of funds that have 
holdings information at the end of May, June, and July.  "Quarter 3" denotes the number of funds that have 
holdings information at the end of August, September, and October.  "Quarter 4" denotes the number of funds that 
have holdings information at the end of November, December, and January. In Panel B, "No of Unique funds" is the 
number of existing funds during the sample period.  "Lifespan" denotes the number of years of fund lifespan.   
       Panel A; Number of funds           
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 Total 
Unique 
Funds 
1995 44 50 23 28 145 64 
1996 8 1 6 7 22 13 
1997 9 16 134 160 319 214 
1998 183 243 269 335 1,030 411 
1999 313 248 306 270 1,137 438 
2000 310 328 513 564 1,715 786 
2001 694 568 635 620 2,517 919 
2002 628 1,213 1,209 1,047 4,097 1,432 
2003 1,191 1,326 1,455 1,106 5,078 1,692 
2004 1,371 1,293 1,114 * 3,778 1,432 
Total 4,751 5,286 5,664 4,137 19,838 34,925 
       
Panel B; Descriptive statistics         
 
  Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4   
 
No of Unique funds 2,016 2,043 2,103 1,869   
 
Average Lifespan 6.19 6.02 6.04 6.40 
  
Std. Lifespan 2.98 3.00 3.00 2.85 
  
Median Lifespan 6.51 6.26 6.25 6.68   
 
       * "Quarter 4" denotes the number of funds that have holdings information at the end of November, 
December, and January. Since I do not have holding for Jan 2005, the number of funds that have 
holdings information at the end of November, December, and January could not be calculated 
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Table 2. Holdings, Buying, Selling by  Past Performance Quintile: Regular Quarter End 
      This table reports the percentage of holdings, sales and purchase of the funds at the end of quarter; March, June, 
September, and December.  I group the same into five groups based on their performance; 1(extreme losers) to 
5(extreme winners). The performance quintiles are constructed as follows.  At each quarter, NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks are sorted intro equal quintiles based on stock return performance over the past year up to that 
quarter, with each quintile having the same distribution of market capitalization.  All numbers are averaged 
over quarters and years. 
 
Panel A. All Funds Combined by LSV method 
        Past Performance Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Sales in Quintile as % of Total Sales 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.25 0.21 
Purchase in Quintile as % of Total Purchase 0.05 0.12 0.20 0.27 0.37 
  
Panel B. All Funds Combined by New method 
        Past Performance Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Universe Holdings in Quintile as % of Total Universe 
Holdings 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.24 
Fund Holdings in Quintile as % of Total Fund Holdings 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.27 0.29 
Sales in Quintile as % of Total Sales 0.06 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.30 
Purchase in Quintile as % of Total Purchase 0.06 0.15 0.19 0.26 0.34 
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Table 3. Holdings, Buying, Selling by  Past Performance Quintile: Quarter End +1 
      This table reports the percentage of holdings, sales and purchase of the funds for the month following quarter 
ends, the “Quarter End +1” holdings data; April, July, October, and January.  I group the same into five groups 
based on their performance; 1(extreme losers) to 5(extreme winners). The performance quintiles are 
constructed as follows.  At each quarter, NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks are sorted intro equal quintiles 
based on stock return performance over the past year up to that quarter, with each quintile having the same 
distribution of market capitalization.  All numbers are averaged over quarters and years 
 
Panel A. All Funds Combined by LSV method 
        Past Performance Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Sales in Quintile as % of Total Sales 0.09 0.18 0.24 0.27 0.22 
Purchase in Quintile as % of Total Purchase 0.05 0.13 0.20 0.29 0.33 
  
Panel B. All Funds Combined by New method 
        Past Performance Quintile 
  1 2 3 4 5 
Universe Holdings in Quintile as % of Total Universe 
Holdings 0.07 0.19 0.24 0.27 0.24 
Fund Holdings in Quintile as % of Total Fund 
Holdings 0.05 0.16 0.22 0.28 0.29 
Sales in Quintile as % of Total Sales 0.06 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.28 
Purchase in Quintile as % of Total Purchase 0.06 0.15 0.19 0.28 0.32 
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Table 4. Sales and Purchases of Funds By Regular Quarter-End 
This table reports the percentage sales and purchase relative to holdings of the funds at the end of quarter; 
March, June, September, and December.  I group the same into five grouped based on their performance; 
1(extreme losers) to 5(extreme winners). The performance quintiles are constructed as follows.  At each 
quarter, NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks are sorted intro equal quintiles based on stock return performance 
over the past year up to that quarter, with each quintile having the same distribution of market capitalization.  
“Selling Intensity” measures the ratio of sales in a performance quintile to holdings of the same stocks at the 
end of the previous quarter divided by the ratio of total sales in current quarter to holdings at the end of the 
previous quarter. “Buying Intensity” measures the fraction of a fund buys in a performance quintile relative to 
the fraction of the universe holdings in the same performance quintile. All numbers are averaged over quarters.  
For regular quarter-end, "Quarter 1" denotes March end.  "Quarter 2" denotes  June end.  "Quarter 3" denotes 
September. "Quarter 4" denotes December end. T-test is for the test of equality of means between quarter 1-3 
and quarter 4. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. T-values and P-values are associated with two-sided 
t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.   
       Panel A. Fourth Quarter vs. 1/2/3rd Quarters 
    Quintile Quarter 1-3 Quarter 4   t-test   p-value 
 
A: Selling Intensity 
    
1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.22 1.17 
 
1.54 
 
0.12 
 
(0.01) (0.05) 
    3 1.03 1.01 
 
1.57 
 
0.11 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
    4 1.05 1.25 
 
-1.39 
 
0.16 
 
(0.01) (0.24) 
    
5 (Extreme Winners) 1.26 1.27 
 
-0.2 
 
0.85 
 
(0.01) (0.05) 
    
       
 
B. Buying Intensity 
    
1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.06 1.11 
 
-4.88 
 
<.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
    3 0.86 0.86 
 
-0.19 
 
0.85 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
    4 0.96 1.01 
 
-9.07 
 
<.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
    
5 (Extreme Winners) 1.70 1.61 
 
5.47 
 
<.01 
  (0.01) (0.02)       
       Panel B.  Sales and Purchases of Funds by Quarter 
    Quintile Quarter 1 Quarter 2   Quarter 3   Quater4 
 
A: Selling Intensity 
    
1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.18 1.26 
 
1.23 
 
1.17 
       3 1.04 1.02 
 
1.02 
 
1.01 
       4 1.05 1.08 
 
1.01 
 
1.25 
       
5 (Extreme Winners) 1.30 1.23 
 
1.27 
 
1.27 
       
 
B. Buying Intensity 
    
1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.09 1.05 
 
1.05 
 
1.11 
       3 0.87 0.84 
 
0.86 
 
0.86 
       4 0.97 0.96 
 
0.94 
 
1.01 
       
5 (Extreme Winners) 1.82 1.64   1.63   1.61 
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Table 5. Sales and Purchases of Funds by  the “Quarter End +1” 
This table reports the percentage sales and purchase relative to holdings of the funds for the month following 
quarter ends, the “Quarter End +1” holdings data; April, July, October, and January. I group the same into five 
groups based on their performance; 1(extreme losers) to 5(extreme winners). The performance quintiles are 
constructed as follows.  At each quarter, NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks are sorted intro equal quintiles based 
on stock return performance over the past year up to that quarter, with each quintile having the same 
distribution of market capitalization.  “Selling Intensity” measures the ratio of sales in a performance quintile to 
holdings of the same stocks at the end of the previous quarter divided by the ratio of total sales in current 
quarter to holdings at the end of the previous quarter. “Buying Intensity” measures the fraction of a fund buys in 
a performance quintile relative to the fraction of the universe holdings in the same performance quintile. All 
numbers are averaged over quarters.  For regular quarter-end, "Quarter 1" denotes April end.  "Quarter 2" 
denotes July end.  "Quarter 3" denotes October end. "Quarter 4" denotes following January end. T-test is for the 
test of equality of means between quarter 1-3 and quarter 4. Standard errors are reported in parentheses. T-
values and P-values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.   
 
       Panel A. Fourth Quarter vs. 1/2/3rd Quarters 
    Quintile Quarter 1-3 Quarter 4   t-test   p-value 
 
A: Selling Intensity 
    1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.20 1.15 
 
0.74 
 
0.45 
 
(0.03) (0.06) 
    3 1.02 1.09 
 
-1.33 
 
0.18 
 
(0.01) (0.10) 
    4 1.06 1.71 
 
-1.93 
 
.05 
 
(0.05) (0.60) 
    5 (Extreme Winners) 1.23 1.22 
 
0.21 
 
0.83 
 
(0.03) (0.05) 
      
 
B. Buying Intensity 
    1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.01 1.00 
 
0.96 
 
0.33 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
    3 0.88 0.87 
 
1.7 
 
0.09 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
    4 1.00 0.95 
 
4.68 
 
<.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
    5 (Extreme Winners) 1.92 1.95 
 
-1.07 
 
0.28 
  (0.01) (0.03)       
       Panel B.  Sales and Purchases of Funds by Quarter
    Quintile Quarter 1 Quarter 2   Quarter 3   Quater4 
 
A: Selling Intensity 
    1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.21 1.18 
 
1.21 
 
1.15 
     3 1.05 1.01 
 
1.00 
 
1.09 
4 0.99 1.05 
 
1.15 
 
1.71 
     5 (Extreme Winners) 1.29 1.26 
 
1.15 
 
1.22 
 
B. Buying Intensity 
    1-2 (Extreme Losers) 1.08 0.95 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
     3 0.92 0.82 
 
0.91 
 
0.87 
4 0.99 1.03 
 
0.98 
 
0.95 
5 (Extreme Winners) 1.93 1.88  1.97  1.95 
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Appendix A 
Evolution of Disclosure Regulations and Market Structure 
 
Section 30(e) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 states that mutual funds must 
disclose semiannually to their investors a list of the securities they hold. SEC rule 
30b1-1 provides more specific information about the various regulatory obligations 
of mutual fund companies. Funds must file N-30D reports at the end of each fiscal 
semiannual period, disclosing the complete portfolio holdings for each individual 
fund they manage. In 2003 the SEC passed new rules that required all mutual fund 
and investment management companies to disclose their holdings on form N-CSR 
and form CSRS, which are used for annual and semi-annual reports respectively. The 
SEC issued updated rules in May of 2004 to require that mutual funds use Form N-Q 
to file electronic quarterly holdings data. The new rules mandate that the data be 
filed no later than 60 days after the end of the quarter. 
 
Managers of mutual funds have particular obligations to their investors. Public 
pension funds and private pension funds managed under defined benefit plans or 
defined contribution plans all fall under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA). This law specifically aims to ensure that the investment 
manager and the custodian are fiduciaries. Particular sections of interest are 
summarized below. 
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Section 402(a) of ERISA provides that every employee benefit plan shall be 
established and maintained pursuant to a written instrument. This instrument must 
provide for one or more named fiduciaries that have authority to control and 
manage the operation and administration of the plan. The fiduciaries may be named 
either in the plan instrument or chosen through a procedure specified in the plan by 
the plan sponsor. 
 
Section 405(c) (1) of ERISA provides, in part, that the named fiduciaries may 
designate persons other than named fiduciaries to carry out fiduciary 
responsibilities (other than trustee responsibilities) under the plan. Section 
405(c)(3) of ERISA defines "trustee responsibility” to mean any responsibility 
provided in the plan's trust instrument to manage fiduciary to appoint an 
investment manager in accordance with section 402(c)(3).  
 
Section 403(a) of ERISA provides, in part, that all assets of an employee benefit plan 
must be held in trust by one or more trustees. The trustee(s) must have exclusive 
authority and discretion to manage and control such assets, with two exceptions: (1) 
when the plan expressly provides that the trustee(s) is subject to the direction of a 
named fiduciary who is not a trustee, in which case the trustees are subject to 
proper directions made in accordance with the terms of the plan, and not contrary 
to ERISA; and (2) when the authority to manage, acquire, or dispose of the plan 
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assets is delegated to one or more investment managers, pursuant to Section 
402(c)(3).  
 
Section 402(c)(3) of ERISA states that a plan may provide that, with respect to 
control or management of the plan assets, a named fiduciary may appoint an 
investment manager or managers to oversee the plan assets (including the power to 
acquire and dispose of those assets).  
 
Section 3(38) of ERISA defines "investment manager" as any fiduciary other than a 
trustee or named fiduciary who (1) has the power to manage, acquire, or dispose of 
any plan asset; (2) is (A) a registered investment adviser, under the Investment 
Adviser’s Act of 1940, (B) a bank, or (C) an insurance company; and (3) has 
acknowledged in writing that he is a fiduciary with respect to the plan.  Thus, from a 
legal perspective, the degree of care exhibited by an “investment manager” is that of 
a fiduciary.  
 
As a complement to the legal framework that defines the overall role of investment 
managers, there is an entire separate set of laws that touches on the day-to-day 
activities of investment managers, custodians, and investors. For the purpose of my 
discussion I will refer to the framework around day-to-day activities as “Market 
Structure”. 
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A.1. Market Structure 
The 1940 Act gives mutual funds several options for maintaining custody of their 
securities, but nearly all U.S. mutual funds today use independent banks as 
custodians. As custodian, a bank does not have title to the assets in its care but 
performs its functions as an agent for the owner. Prior to the 1960s, a custodian 
bank usually had full discretionary responsibility for investing the assets held in a 
pension trust. In the 1960s and 1970s, plan sponsors began appointing independent 
investment managers, and the bank’s status changed in many cases to that of a 
directed trustee. A directed trustee is a trustee in all respects, except that the named 
fiduciary has delegated investment authority to a third-party investment 
manager(s), and the trustee is instructed to accept directions from the investment 
manager(s) with respect to all investment matters. The law does allow an 
investment company to self-custody but the investment company with self-custody 
must place assets with a qualified bank. Independent public auditors must verify 
these assets at least three times during each fiscal year. Two of these times must be 
chosen by the accountant, without prior notice to the company. Mutual funds and 
closed-end funds must keep their assets in the custody of a qualified U.S. bank, or, 
subject to SEC rules, with a broker-dealer that is a member of a national securities 
exchange. A central depository may be used for an investment company's portfolio 
securities.  
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The custodian holds the fund’s securities in safekeeping and manages the cash 
movements involved in settling trades and income payments. In the recent past, 
many of the fund’s securities holdings took the form of physical certificates, and the 
custodian held these in its vault. Physically issued securities are much less common 
today, but they still exist. When a fund does hold certificates, these are kept in the 
custodian’s vault. More commonly, the securities exist only as computer records 
with the custodian, depository, and issuer. Figure 2 depicts the common 
relationships among issuers of securities, depositories, custodians, and funds. 
 
The custodian maintains both cash and securities accounts at each of the 
depositories. The securities account contains all the securities held by mutual funds 
and other clients of that custodian. The cash account is used to move money to and 
from the depository in the settlement of trades and other transactions, such as 
dividend and interest payments. When the exchange-listed stock trade settles, the 
depository moves money from the cash account of the buying custodian (or broker) 
to the cash account of the selling custodian (or broker), and changes its ownership 
records by adding to the buying custodian’s security account and subtracting from 
the selling account.  
 
Issuers of securities (or their transfer agents) make income and dividend payments 
to the depositories, and the depositories allocate the payments to the appropriate 
custodial accounts. Custodians then allocate the income to the clients for whom they 
are holding the securities. Any such event generates what is called a corporate 
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action notice, which is provided by the issuer of securities (or their transfer agents) 
to their custodians and is forwarded by the custodian to the investment advisor for 
whom the security is held in custody. In cases where the holding is in physical form, 
the issuer or transfer agent sends the income directly to the custodian. The 
custodian allocates the income it receives from the issuer, either directly or via the 
depository, to the client accounts it holds. The investment management back office, 
which is itself keeping a securities inventory and accruing income, compares its 
expectations with the custodian’s actual receipts to ensure that everything is 
correct.  
 
This sophisticated process implies that the custodians can build an extra layer of 
oversight in the system, which reduces manager’s incentives to engage in activities 
that are not permitted under the realm of regulations.  In other word, it is not 
feasible for mutual fund managers to execute buy/see orders without going through 
the custodians and leaving a permanent paper trail.  To provide a clearer picture of 
the daily interplay between custodians, investment managers and broker/dealers, 
the following section goes into further detail about the settlement process.   
 
 
A.2. Settlement Process 
 
Every time an investment manager decides to buy or sell any security, irrespective 
of the exchange where the transaction occurs, it triggers a series of interactions 
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among several parties that eventually results in the buyer of the security getting 
ownership and the seller getting cash. Collectively, this chain of events constitutes 
the trade settlement process. 
 
Figure 3 summarizes the entities and activities involved in settling one of the most 
common types of trade, that of an exchange-listed equity (IBM or General Motors 
common stock, for example). On the day of the trade (trade date, or T), the exchange 
starts the settlement process by determining whether the attributes of the trade 
(e.g., quantity, price, etc.) as submitted by the selling broker or specialist are the 
same as those submitted by the buying broker or specialist. If they are, the exchange 
considers the trade matched, and sends the record of the trade to the clearing 
organization—in this case, the National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC). 
Simultaneously, the broker sends a notice of execution (NOE) to the investment 
advisor. 
 
NSCC and other clearing organizations provide central locations to which trades are 
submitted for clearance processing, which includes trade comparison, netting, and 
money settlement. The clearing corporation interposes itself between the buying 
and selling parties, guaranteeing the settlement of all successfully matched trades. 
The clearing corporation generates settlement obligations that initiate the 
delivery/receipt of securities and receipt/delivery of monies. Without the clearing 
organizations, each party involved in trading would have to set up agreements and 
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facilities to deal directly and individually with every other party, creating a network 
of monstrous proportions.  
 
Currently, listed equities in the United States settle in three days, commonly 
referred to as T+3. On the days between trade and settlement, the various parties 
exchange information to ensure proper settlement. The investment advisor has until 
the morning of T+2 to give the broker delivery details, such as the allocation of the 
order (i.e., which fund will actually own the shares being bought), the prices of the 
allocations, and the name of the custodian. The advisor gives matching information 
to the fund’s custodian so that the custodian can move money properly on 
settlement date.  
 
Upon receipt of the delivery details from the investment advisor, the broker (in the 
case of our exchange-listed stock example) communicates the details to the 
Depository Trust Corporation (DTC) in the form of a confirmation. As part of the 
trade settlement process, DTC routes confirmations to the investment advisor, the 
custodian, and the broker dealer. The confirmation says, in effect, “This is what I at 
DTC believe all of you have agreed upon regarding this trade.” If both sides respond 
affirmatively to this notification (“affirm the confirm”) within the agreed-upon 
deadlines, ownership is switched and money changes hands on T+3.  
 
The trade operations group (back office) makes sure trades are successfully 
processed all the way to completion. It obtains records of trades that have been 
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executed by the front office and compare them to the notifications that come in from 
the broker and clearing organization. It confirms the trades with the brokers, and 
they affirm the trades through DTC. If one of the parties involved in the settlement 
sends a non-recognition notice (called a DK, for “don’t know”), all the involved 
parties research and resolve the problem so that the trade can settle properly. Most 
often, DKs result from one of the parties—investment manager or broker—not 
including enough information on the record it creates of a trade, making it 
impossible for the trade to be recognized.  
 
If a discrepancy causes a trade to fail—that is, to be invalidated and have to be 
redone—that can be costly for the investment manager. For example, consider the 
case in which the advisor sells a security, the security’s price on the market falls 
significantly, and then the trade fails. If the advisor has to make the sale again at the 
new, lower price, someone has lost money. In this situation, the regulations make it 
clear that the investment advisor, not the fund, is on the hook for the losses. The SEC 
interprets Section 206 of the 1940 Act—the anti-fraud provisions—to mean that 
advisors are expected to insulate clients from trading losses8. The SEC has made it 
clear that an advisor cannot use soft dollar arrangements to absorb any loss for 
which it is responsible; it has to come out of the advisor’s pockets. Needless to say, 
the back office works hard to ensure that trades do not fail. When a trade failure 
does occur, the trade operations group must determine who is at fault (e.g., advisor, 
broker, counter-party), and the amount of loss that must be made up to the fund.  
                                                 
8
 Steven Goldstein, “Error Correction,” Compliance Reporter (December 21, 1998). 
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Once the trade is made, the various counterparties exchange information to confirm 
their understanding of the trade details. Different clearance and settlement agents, 
depending on the type of security being traded, facilitate these interactions. In all 
cases, it is a well-documented process involving the investment advisor, the 
custodian, and the broker dealer in each and every trade.  
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ESSAY II: Delay in Portfolio Holdings Disclosures 
Maneesh L. Chhabria 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulates market 
information for two reasons. Certain regulations prohibit the creation of false 
market information and are designed to prevent fraud. These provisions ensure the 
accuracy of information disseminated into our securities market, thus maintaining 
the integrity of the markets. Other regulations provide material information of value 
to issuers and investors regarding the identities of shareholders and large 
institutional investors. The Senate Report to the 1975 Securities Act noted 
 
that different investors may draw different conclusions from the data [but that] 
is not important; rather what is important is that information about the 
securities holdings and certain transactions of institutional investors be 
available to all investors, both institutional and retail—so that they can all 
have it, whatever its relative usefulness in making their independent 
judgments…A disclosure program should stimulate a higher degree of 
confidence in the integrity of our securities market.  
 
Over the years the SEC has provided rulings that continue to influence how this 
market information is provided to investors. Total assets managed by mutual funds 
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have grown immensely in the time since the SEC began regulating market 
information. This has driven significant interest in information regarding portfolio 
holdings. Paul Rove, the Director of the Division of Investment Management at the 
SEC, noted that they regularly receive rulemaking petitions asking the SEC to 
increase the frequency with which mutual fund portfolio holdings are disclosed.9 
Finally, in 2003, regulators started responding to the market demand for timely 
disclosure of mutual funds. The SEC increased the required portfolio disclosure 
frequency from semiannual disclosure to quarterly disclosure, effective May 2004. 
In addition, the SEC ruled that it would require the disclosures to be released with a 
60-day delay as before. There would be no change to the number of days of delay in 
holdings disclosure. 
 
There were 32 comments addressing this specific issue during the public comment 
period for this regulation. Individual investors, members of the fund industry, 
professional association members, bar members, and other interested parties all 
contributed comments.10 The comments included little actual data that could be 
used as evidence for or against the proposal.  
 
The commission noted that some commenters11, including individuals and advocacy 
groups, suggested that portfolio disclosure should be required even more frequently 
                                                 
9 Paul Rove, Mutual Funds and Investment Management Conference; Mar 19 2001. 
10 Christopher Kaiser and John M. Faust (eds.), “Summary of Comments: Proposed Rules Regarding 
Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of Registered Management Investment 
Companies, January 30, 2004,” U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 
11 See Appendix B for a complete list. 
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than quarterly. These commenters also suggested that the maximum delay in 
disclosure be reduced to 30 days, compared to the 60 days mandated at that time. In 
contrast, other commenters raised concerns that mandating quarterly disclosure 
might expand the opportunities for professional investors to engage in predatory 
trading practices—the expanded disclosure could allow a “free ride” on the 
investment strategies and research paid for by the active fund investors. 
 
The SEC acknowledged that it needed to strike a balance between the investors’ 
interest in more frequent portfolio holdings and the cost associated with making the 
holdings information available to investors. The SEC also recognized the concern 
that expanded disclosure would allow greater opportunity for professional traders 
to exploit information by engaging in predatory trading practices.  
 
Wermers (2001) and Frank, Poterba, Shackelford, and Shoven (2004) note that the 
cost of frequent portfolio disclosure includes direct costs—from the research 
expenses of actively managed funds, for example—as well as indirect costs arising 
from predatory practices. “Front-running” was a particular concern. In this 
technique, professional traders buy the securities before the fund does, thereby 
bidding up the prices of these securities. Professional traders can also “front-run” 
fund trades by selling ahead of the fund and depressing the prices of securities that 
the fund is trying to sell. “Front-running” is only possible if the holdings disclosure 
takes place before the fund manager has moved as many shares as desired. Either 
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way, when investment managers are increasing or decreasing their stakes in a firm, 
the actions of professional traders can negatively impact mutual fund investors. 
 
Before the SEC issued the 2004 disclosure rules, the industry had already moved 
gradually and voluntarily toward increased disclosure. In 2001 the Investment 
Company Institute12 collected information about the portfolio disclosure policies of 
24 fund groups that collectively managed nearly $2.2 trillion. They found that these 
funds chose to disclose all fund holdings—either routinely to all shareholders or to 
any shareholder who requests the information—more frequently than 
semiannually.  
 
Regulators, academics, and practitioners pointed out benefits of the proposed 2004 
regulations. If funds were required to disclose their complete portfolio holdings 
information more frequently than semiannually and/or within a short delay, 
investors would be more able to judge the extent to which their funds’ portfolios 
overlap, and they could therefore make more informed decisions about their asset 
allocation. Frequent disclosure would expose—and potentially discourage—a 
variety of ways in which fund managers can mislead investors about the true nature 
of their investment portfolios.13 First, “style drift” occurs when actual fund holdings 
deviate from the stated investment objective of the fund. Second, investment 
managers engage in “window dressing” when, immediately before disclosure and 
with the intention of misleading investors, they sell stocks that have 
                                                 
12 Survey of Fund Groups’ Portfolio Disclosure Policies, 2001. 
13 For further details see Portfolio Disclosure Release, Section IIB. 
56 
 
 
underperformed and buy stocks that have outperformed. In “portfolio pumping,” 
investment managers choose stocks they own that have outperformed and try to 
push up the price of these stocks by placing large buy orders on the record date of 
the disclosure. These latter two techniques are short-term methods that incur 
transaction costs and mislead investors. 
 
This paper attempts to quantify, from an investors’ perspective, the impact of 
reducing the delay in reporting mutual fund holdings. The debates among 
regulators, academics, and practitioners have relied on rhetoric rather than 
empirical evidence and analysis. These debates have also focused on whether the 
current delay of 45 days in filing 13F filings and its quarterly filing requirement 
should be increased to 60 days. Even the SEC, in its final rules14, noted 
 
[w]e are not requiring more frequent portfolio disclosure, or a shorter delay, 
because we take seriously concerns that more frequent portfolio holdings 
disclosure and/or a shorter delay for release of this information may expand 
the opportunities for predatory trading practices that harm fund shareholders. 
 
In the next paragraph it adds: 
 
                                                 
14 SEC Release Nos. 33-8393; 34-49333; IC-26372 (May 10, 2004) (“Portfolio Disclosure Release”). 
57 
 
 
Commenters have not presented concrete evidence that quarterly disclosure of 
aggregate holdings by institutional investment managers on Form 13F has 
resulted in such trading practices. 
 
How useful is the information available through disclosure? There is a rich body of 
literature that has examined whether mutual fund managers are able to beat their 
respective benchmarks. The works by Gruber (1996) and Wermers (2000), among 
many others, have generally found that managers are unable to beat their respective 
benchmarks, net of expenses. Whether or not fund managers are truly able to beat 
their benchmarks, anyone who believes that there is value to the research 
undertaken by active investment manager could try to capture that return by 
creating copycat portfolios based on portfolio holdings disclosure. The copycat 
portfolio could then reap superior returns without bearing the costs. A copycat 
portfolio’s ability to beat the actual portfolio on which it was based depends on the 
frequency with which portfolio information is disclosed and the mandated delay in 
disclosure of that information. In this study, I create copycat funds in order to 
analyze and quantify the potential effect of reducing the maximum delay of 
disclosure. I do not endeavor to quantify other costs or the possible benefits arising 
from more frequent disclosure.   
 
My analysis shows that the current 60-day delay in disclosure provides a sufficient 
amount of delay that copycat portfolios cannot free-ride on the information 
available from actual portfolios. In the first month after disclosure, the copycat 
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portfolio underperforms the actual portfolio by 0.26%. The results provide strong 
support for the current disclosure regime even when I look at funds based on 
performance or size of assets under management.  
 
On the other hand the results suggest that decreasing the delay would harm mutual 
fund investors. A 30-day delay in disclosure would cause actual portfolio returns to 
be lower than copycat portfolio returns by nearly 0.54% for the first month after 
disclosure. Even for small funds the actual portfolio returns are lower than copycat 
portfolio returns for the first month after disclosure, with a difference of nearly 
0.64%.  These patterns of over- or underperformance of actual portfolio returns vis-
à-vis copycat portfolio returns over varying delays provide important insights about 
possible effects of disclosure regulations on investors. 
 
This paper will contribute to the financial disclosure policy debate by quantifying 
one aspect of the cost of reducing the delay in portfolio disclosure. It will also look at 
the effect of different delays in disclosure on possible returns to investors in copycat 
portfolios.  
 
The rest of the paper commences with section II which is a summary of regulations 
related to mutual fund holdings disclosure requirements, followed by a literature 
review. In section III I then present a discussion of the data and methodology used 
for creating the copycat portfolios. Next, in section IV, I present an empirical 
analysis of the data, as well as robustness tests. Following this, I discuss the results 
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of my analysis. The analysis is done also by segmenting the fund data on the basis of 
historical performance and on asset size. The primary aim is to see if the effects 
observed on the entire dataset materially change when one takes a more granular 
look at the data. The analysis is done across various buy-and-hold period returns 
using 30-, 60-, or 90-day delays in disclosure. Lastly, in section V,  I offer conclusions 
and propose some directions for further research. 
 
 
2. Mutual Fund Regulations and Literature Review  
 
2.1. Introduction to Mutual Fund Regulations 
 
The history of mutual funds holdings disclosure requirements can be traced to 
the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended (the “1940 Act”). From its 
inception, the 1940 Act required that every mutual fund provide a semiannual 
report to its shareholders15 that, among other things, included a list showing 
amounts and values of securities owned by the fund at the end of the applicable 
reporting period.16 The reports must be provided to shareholders at the end of a 
fund’s second and fourth fiscal year quarters17 and filed with the Commission on 
Form N-CSR.18 The report must be sent to fund shareholders within 60 days of the 
                                                 
15 Section 30 of 1940 Act. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Rule 30e-1 under the 1940 Act. 
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applicable reporting period,19 and must be filed with the Commission on Form N-
CSR within 10 days thereafter.20  
 
In 2004, however, a new rule regarding disclosure about holdings of mutual funds 
came into effect. Under the new rules, the Commission now requires a fund to file a 
list of its complete portfolio holdings with the Commission on a quarterly basis.21 
Since 2004, the SEC has required a fund to file its complete portfolio schedules after 
the end of its first and third fiscal quarters on the new Form N-Q.22 In effect, this 
amendment means that a mutual fund must disclose its portfolio holdings on a 
quarterly basis and that the data must be released with a maximum delay of 60 days 
after the end of the quarter. It is important to note that unlike with the semiannual 
reports filed on Form N-CSR and delivered to fund shareholders, the portfolio 
holdings disclosure reports made on Form N-Q are only provided to the SEC23—
although, as publicly filed documents, they are available to fund shareholders on the 
SEC’s website. 
 
When the SEC changed its rules about disclosure, it agreed with commenters who 
made the argument that investors would benefit if funds were required to disclose 
their complete portfolio schedules more frequently than semiannually.24 The 
frequency of portfolio disclosure by funds allows investors to understand better the 
                                                 
19 Id. 
20 Rule 30b2-1 under the 1940 Act. 
21 Rule 30b1-5 under the 1940 Act. 
22  Id. 
23  Id. 
24 SEC Release Nos. 33-8393; 34-49333; IC-26372 (May 10, 2004) (“Portfolio Disclosure Release”). 
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extent to which their funds’ portfolios overlap, accordingly, the investors would be 
able to make more informed asset allocation decisions. In addition, frequent 
disclosure exposes “style drift” when actual fund holdings deviate from the stated 
investment objective of the fund. It also sheds light on—and potentially 
discourages—other techniques such as “window dressing” and “portfolio pumping” 
that can mislead investors about the true nature of their investment portfolios.25  
 
During the public comment period in 2003, many commentators requested that the 
delay in disclosure of portfolio holdings should be reduced from 60 days to 30 days, 
since this would allow for timelier monitoring of fund managers by shareholders.26 
The commenters argued that quarterly disclosure would substantially improve 
mutual fund investors’ ability to make informed investment decisions.27 Arguably, 
the main benefit of this shorter disclosure window would be that shareholders 
would be able to detect earlier changes in a fund’s portfolio composition that 
deviate from its stated investment objectives and strategies. 
 
On the other hand, the SEC also acknowledged the concerns of other commenters 
who raised the possibility that expanded disclosure would allow greater 
opportunity for professional traders to exploit information by engaging in predatory 
trading practices (e.g., through copycat funds).28 In other words, the investors in a 
copycat fund would get a “free ride” from the investment strategies and research 
                                                 
25 For further details see Portfolio Disclosure Release, Section IIB. 
26 See Portfolio Disclosure Release. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
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paid for by the active fund investors. Since the investors in the copycat fund are not 
paying for the research developed by an active fund manager, the copycat fund 
investors start with a relatively lower cost structure. This entire argument is based 
on the premise that there is value to active fund management in terms of its 
research and carefully designed strategies based on the research. 
 
Even as the SEC was reviewing the comments regarding its change to disclosure 
policies, many firms were already providing disclosure more frequently than was 
legally required. These firms in total had AUM equal to nearly $2 trillion according 
to the Investment Company Institute report in 2001.29 Some of these firms provided 
their investors access to their holdings with only a one-month delay, which was 
much shorter than was legally required at that point in time. These investment firms 
believed that investors viewed their actions favorably, and they were hoping to 
accumulate further assets based on this greater level of transparency. 
 
Every day, scores of portfolio managers and other senior investment professionals 
appear in the media—on television and in print articles—where they share their 
current investment strategies. The Wall Street Journal, Barron’s, The Financial Times, 
and other financial publications carry articles in which fund managers talk about 
their best stock ideas and the reasoning behind their decisions. Assuming that these 
experts are sharing information in good faith, this widespread willingness to discuss 
investment strategies suggests that, from a manager’s perspective, timely disclosure 
                                                 
29 Survey of Fund Groups’ Portfolio Disclosure Policies, Investment Company Institute 2001. 
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should not be an issue. The only caveat to this argument is that it assumes that these 
experts who are featured on television or in news articles present the full picture of 
their very best ideas and also that their ideas are actually actionable and profitable.   
 
However, as the SEC noted, more frequent disclosures add new direct costs to 
mutual funds and, ultimately, to their shareholders.30 In addition, it is important to 
acknowledge other indirect costs that could negatively impact investors fund 
returns. When a fund frequently discloses its holdings, it becomes easier for other 
investors to use information on fund trades to “front-run” them. This action 
potentially raises the cost to fund managers and their investors. It raises the price of 
shares that they hoped to acquire, and reduces future returns as a result. It also 
allows the front-runner to benefit from the efforts made in researching the stock, 
without having to bear any of the cost of research. The ability to front-run a fund 
typically may occur only if a fund manager discloses his positions while he is still 
building them. If a manager discloses his portfolio positions after he has completely 
built them up, then front-running cannot occur. But how many days does it takes for 
a manager to build up or sell down his positions? Some people argue that a 30-day 
delay in portfolio holdings disclosure is more than enough time to allow portfolio 
managers to build up or sell down their holdings, while others argue that a delay of 
60 or even 90 days is appropriate. But the one thing that is clear is that the delay in 
portfolio holdings disclosure has a meaningful effect on negating the impact of front-
running.  
                                                 
30 Id. 
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Under Section 30(e) of the 1940 Act, mutual funds must semiannually disclose to 
their investors a list of securities that they hold. Rules 30b1-5, 30b2-1, and 30e-1 
under the 1940 Act provide more specific information about the various regulatory 
obligations of mutual fund companies in making these disclosures. Among other 
things, they require a mutual fund to file its complete portfolio schedule for the 
second and fourth fiscal quarters on Form N-CSR, within 60 days after the end of 
their second and fourth fiscal year quarter ends.31 In 2004, a new rule regarding 
disclosure of mutual funds holdings came into effect. Under the new rules adopted 
by the Commission, a fund is now required to file a list of its complete portfolio 
holdings with the Commission on a quarterly basis, with one modification.32 The 
modification mandated that a fund also file its complete portfolio schedules for the 
first and third fiscal quarters on new Form N-Q, within 60 days of the end of the 
applicable quarterly period. The commission noted: 
 
We have determined to adopt the proposed requirement for quarterly disclosure of 
portfolio holdings with a 60-day delay. We are not requiring more frequent 
portfolio disclosure, or a shorter delay, because we take seriously concerns that 
more frequent portfolio holdings disclosure and/or a shorter delay for release of 
                                                 
31 Under the 1940 Act, funds file their holdings semiannually and annually to comply with Rule 30e-
1(a) and Rule 30e-1(c), respectively. Refer to Section III for detailed information. 
32 Portfolio Disclosure Release. 
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this information may expand the opportunities for predatory trading practices 
that harm fund shareholders. 33 
 
One of the commenters on the Commission’s proposed portfolio disclosure changes 
further recommended that the Commission require the filing of 13(f) reports within 
60 days after the end of the relevant period, instead of 45 days. The Commission, 
however, determined that a 45-day period was appropriate because it is consistent 
with the timing requirements of Schedule 13G reports: particularly in light of the 
fact that parts of Form 13F may be used to satisfy requirements of Schedule 13G.  
 
Congress adopted Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act as part of the 
Securities Act Amendments of 1975. Under that section, an investment manager 
who exercises investment discretion with respect to accounts holding equity 
securities having an aggregate fair market value of $100 million or more must file 
quarterly reports of those holdings on Form 13F.34 When it was enacted, one of the 
primary purposes of Section 13(f) was to create a central repository of information 
about the investment activities of institutional investment managers at the 
Commission, in order to allow regulatory agencies to analyze the influence of those 
managers over the securities markets. There was also a belief that the disclosure of 
such information would permit regulators to have a better understanding of the 
                                                 
33 SEC Release Nos. 33-8393; 34-49333; IC-26372 (May 10, 2004) (“Portfolio Disclosure Release”). 
34 Further details http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/13fpt2.htm. 
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public policy implications of the investment activities institutional investors.35 
Congress also had expressed its intent to increase the public availability of 
information regarding the purchase, sale, and holdings of securities by institutional 
investors. Even investment managers who are advisors or sub-advisors to mutual 
funds must file a 13F filing, in addition to filings mandated under the Investment 
Company Act. For 13F filings, fund families aggregate all their portfolio holdings 
across all the mutual funds and separate accounts for which they are advisors or 
sub-advisors, giving an aggregate view of fund family holdings. A 13F filing for large 
sub-advisors like Blackrock or BNYMellon, for example, will include aggregate data 
on the thousands of mutual fund portfolios they manage. Portfolio holdings data 
disclosed under the Investment Company Act of 1940, on the other hand, is filed on 
a fund-by-fund basis. Hence more nuanced observations can be made from 
examining the fund-by-fund filings than the 13F filings.  
 
From a mutual fund perspective, the new disclosure rules that came into effect in 
2004 would mean that a mutual fund would reveal its portfolio holdings on a 
quarterly basis. Commenters addressing the SEC’s proposed portfolio disclosure 
changes suggested that the interval between the end of a reporting period and the 
disclosure of a fund’s portfolio holdings should be 30 days rather than 60 days 
because this would allow for more timely monitoring of fund managers by 
shareholders.36 The basis for this request was that a shorter disclosure period 
                                                 
35 For further details see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14852, at 5 (June 15, 1978) (Adopting 
Release). 
36 Portfolio Disclosure Release. 
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would benefit shareholders by allowing shareholders to detect earlier any changes 
in a fund’s investment portfolio that might suggest a deviation from its stated 
investment objectives and strategies. However, the benefits accruing from a 
potential reduction in agency costs would have to be balanced against potential 
costs to shareholders.  
 
Accordingly, it has become important to test for the ideal period for the mandatory 
delay in disclosing holding data. This essay will help determine whether 60-day 
delay is necessary or not.    
 
2.2. Literature Review 
 
Wermers (2001) notes that there are potential costs to a fund when it discloses 
holdings information. When a fund discloses its holdings, it becomes easier for other 
investors to use information on fund inflows to “front-run” the fund’s trades, 
thereby bidding up the prices of the securities that fund managers want to buy. 
Wermers analyzes a small group of funds with semiannual disclosure, showing that 
disclosure reduces the time period over which fund investors are able to benefit 
from the rewards of their managers’ securities research. Managers are paid by their 
investors to find underpriced assets that will generate above-average, risk-adjusted 
returns.  
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Chen, Jagdeesh, and Wermers (2000) demonstrate that less than one-half of the 
total abnormal return earned from the purchase of a stock by a mutual fund occurs 
during the first quarter after the date that the stock first appears in a publicly-
disclosed (semiannual) portfolio list. The remainder is earned during the following 
three quarters. The authors assert that the study actually understates the level of 
return made possible by monthly disclosure. That is, it cannot measure the 
abnormal return accruing between the time the stock is actually purchased and the 
date the stock first appears in a publicly-disclosed portfolio list. This time period can 
be up to six months later, as per reporting regulations in place until May 2004. This 
study points out that the possible cost of an increased frequency for disclosure is 
much higher than currently recognized. 
 
However, even before the new regulation came into effect, many fund managers 
voluntarily disclosed their fund positions more frequently than the SEC required. 
Some fund managers felt that investors preferred funds that provided timely and 
more frequent disclosure than required. In effect, more frequent disclosure was a 
sign of good faith and would allow the fund to be rewarded by investors with more 
investments. 
 
Another aspect of holdings disclosure is the possibility of copycat funds having 
higher net returns by “free-riding” on the research of other funds. Frank et al. 
(2004) investigated the viability of such a strategy by studying the returns of a set of 
actively managed funds between 1992 and 1999. If frequent disclosure eliminates 
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the capacity of actively managed funds to reap the potential benefits of their 
research findings, the before-expense returns of copycat funds would be 
indistinguishable from the analogous returns of the original funds. In this case, the 
net-of-expense returns of the copycat funds would exceed those of the primitive 
funds. The findings from Frank et al. (2004) suggest that semiannual disclosure may 
be costly to actively managed funds, because this enables competitors to construct 
portfolios that mimic, albeit with a time lag, the primitive fund's holdings. They also 
add that the disparity between net-of-expenses returns for the copycat and 
primitive funds is sensitive to their assumption about the expenses associated with 
managing a copycat fund. They point out that if copycat fund had fees of 68 basis 
points per year, then copycat funds returns are less than primitive funds based on 
their sample.  
 
This article investigates whether looking at quarterly disclosure of fund holdings 
and mimicking those changes is a profitable strategy. In particular I look at the 
possible effect of having different delays in disclosure of holdings data. Other papers 
have focused primarily on whether disclosure itself is harmful, and I address this 
question as well. In addition I also want to show which of the possible choices of 
delay in disclosure—30 days, 60 days, or 90 days—provides the best balance from a 
mutual fund investors’ perspective.   
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3. Data & Methodology 
 
3.1. Data 
 
This study is focused on equity mutual funds that are benchmarked to the 
S&P 500 Index. These equity funds comprise a significant portion of investors’ 
portfolios. By focusing on equity funds that aim to beat the S&P 500 Index, I avoid 
possible issues with funds that track different benchmarks. Funds that are focused 
on the small-cap indices or sector-focused indices would have different holdings 
profiles and would not be representative of the broader market. For example, real 
estate–focused funds would own stocks that would be completely different than a 
broad market fund. Differences in their portfolio compositions are primarily driven 
by the difference in their benchmarks. Having a dataset comprised of mutual funds 
with varying aims would materially influence the analysis. Hence I decided to focus 
only on mutual funds benchmarked to the S&P 500 Index. 
 
One of the less appreciated facts of the mutual fund world is that mutual funds have 
provided fund rating firms—like Morningstar and Lipper, among others—with 
detailed fund holdings at a much higher frequency than they are required to do for 
regulatory reasons. For this study Morningstar provided the complete dataset of all 
equity funds that tracked the S&P 500 Index. All the funds are actively managed 
funds. Index funds were excluded from the analysis because their composition is 
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transparent to the market on a daily basis. These mutual funds provided 
Morningstar with their holdings data at a frequency higher than that required by 
securities regulations between 1995 and 2004.  
 
In the dataset of equity mutual funds benchmarked to the S&P 500 Index, there is a 
total of 3,740 unique funds for which portfolio holdings data are available. Not all of 
these funds existed during the entire time frame from 1995 to 2004. Since the data 
were provided to Morningstar by the funds on a voluntary basis, the holdings for all 
funds are not consistently available across every time period. For example, some 
funds provided portfolio holdings data on a quarterly basis, while others provided 
portfolio holdings data on a monthly basis. Since my interest is to examine the data 
on a quarterly basis, the number of funds that provide that information is shown in 
Table 1. Table 1 shows that the number of funds benchmarked to the S&P 500 Index 
has increased from 598 funds at the end of 1995 to nearly 2,600 funds at the end of 
2004. This is indicative of the tremendous growth in mutual funds. 
 
<Insert Table 1> 
 
Many mutual funds are allowed by their investment guidelines to hold small 
amounts of foreign securities or other instruments. But, since they have the vast 
majority of their investments in equities, they are still classified as equity funds. I 
include only those funds with a total weight of 99% in equities, bonds, and cash 
because pricing information for exotic instruments is not available. As shown in 
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Table 2, there are a total of 3,672 funds out of 3,740 that satisfy these criteria. I use 
the portfolio holdings data of these funds to create copycat funds. 
 
<Insert Table 2> 
<Insert Table 3> 
 
The dataset also contains mutual fund returns (net of expenses) for multiple share 
classes. Different share classes have different fee structures, but that information is 
not available consistently across all mutual funds. Also not all mutual funds have 
multiple share classes. Hence it is not possible to compare all mutual funds across a 
consistent share class. I base my analysis on each mutual fund’s share class with the 
highest return (SECID). I further support my results by analyzing whether there is 
any change in results if we use fund’s  share class with the lowest return (SECID). 
 
<Insert Table 4> 
 
3.2. Definition of Copycat Portfolio 
 
To quantify the cost of reducing the delay in portfolio holdings disclosure, I 
construct copycat portfolios based on the holdings of the actual portfolios in my 
original dataset. Once I build copycat portfolios, I compare their returns against the 
returns of the actual portfolios over the corresponding time frames.   
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The copycat portfolio holds the same securities with the same weights as those held 
by the actual portfolio, but with a lag due to the delay in disclosure of the holdings 
information of the actual portfolio. For example, if the law states that actual 
portfolio holdings are to be disclosed with a delay of 60 days, then actual portfolio 
holdings at the end of March will be available only at the end of May. Therefore the 
copycat portfolio that is built at the end of May will have the same weights that the 
actual portfolio had at the end of March. Figure 1, Panel B, illustrates what a 60-day 
delay means in terms of how/why the copycat portfolio is always two months 
behind the actual portfolio. Figure 1, Panel A and Panel C, shows the same 
illustration for a 90-day delay and a 30-day delay respectively. 
 
<Insert Figure 1> 
 
3.3. Methodology & Hypothesis 
 
The idea behind creating copycat portfolios with 30-, 60-, and 90-day delays 
is to see what effects the various delays have on the returns of the copycat portfolio 
vis-à-vis the actual portfolio. This approach generates quantitative evidence to 
identify the optimal length of delay, from the perspective of a shareholder in an 
actively managed fund, for disclosure of fund holdings.  
 
If a portfolio manager generates alpha (excess returns), then the manager would be 
concerned that a copycat portfolio based on portfolio disclosure would be able to 
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free-ride on the research conducted by the portfolio manager. Even if one were to 
believe that the majority of the fund managers do not beat their respective indexes 
over time, there would be some informational advantage that a copycat portfolio 
could gain by mimicking an actual portfolio with the least amount of delay. In other 
words, the returns of an actual portfolio should be greater than the returns of its 
copycat portfolio when there is a delay in disclosure. 
 
H: Do 30/60/90-day delays in releasing the holdings information of the actual 
portfolio reduce the ability of the copycat portfolio to track the returns of the actual 
portfolio? If so, then 
 
Ractual, X-day delay > Rcopycat, X-day delay 
 
where Ractual is the actual return on the portfolio net of expenses and Rcopycat, X-
day delay is the return on the copycat portfolio net of expenses and whose 
portfolio weights are known with an X-day delay, where X is 30, 60, or 90 
days.  
 
From an investor’s perspective, the returns that matter are net returns after 
expenses. Accordingly, I focus on net of expense returns in the remainder of the 
analysis. I set the expense ratio of the copycat portfolio at 20 bps, as done by Frank 
and Poterba et al. (2004). I set the expense structure of the copycat portfolio at 20 
bps as well. This is a conservative estimate for the copycat portfolio. The copycat 
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portfolio would have lower costs because it has fewer transactions than the actual 
portfolio does. The copycat portfolio is being rebalanced only at the end of each 
quarter while the actual portfolio absorbs the cost of trades within that quarter. And 
since the copycat portfolio just tracks the actual portfolio with a certain delay, it will 
have lower staff expenses compared to an actively managed fund. This would tend 
to understate the returns of the copycat portfolio vis-à-vis the actual portfolio. 
 
The return of the copycat portfolio is the value-weighted sum of the monthly 
returns for each stock held by the actual portfolio. The effect of transaction costs is 
ignored because I assume that the copycat portfolio would be able to buy and sell at 
prices provided by CRSP. By ignoring transaction costs that would negatively impact 
the returns of the copycat portfolio, this approach overstates the returns that can be 
achieved by a copycat portfolio. CRSP daily returns, including distributions, are used 
to calculate the monthly returns for the stocks. Even though this study is looking at 
equity funds, I still find that they hold some bonds from time to time. For all bonds, I 
assume that bonds earn the Barclays Total Bond Return Index. For cash, I assume 
that earnings equal the one-month Treasury bill return. I assume that returns on all 
other hybrid securities, preferred stocks, and other such securities that are not 
listed in CRSP are the same as the return on the funds’ other assets. In addition, 
Table 2 shows that the median portfolio weight in the other categories across 
various time frames is negligible. 
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I do not attempt to model certain other nuances that would occur in this process in 
the real world. First, because of the delayed disclosure, the copycat portfolios buy 
the securities after the actual portfolios do. The copycat portfolios would thus 
invariably have a positive market impact, pushing up the returns of the actual 
portfolio. But this effect, which positively affects the returns of actual portfolios, is 
not captured in this analysis. Second, if fund managers expect copycat funds to 
mimic their strategies, they would mask their behavior by moving the timing of 
their trades, thereby negatively affecting the returns of the copycat portfolios. The 
current analysis is based on data that was not all publicly available, and so it is 
reasonable to assume that the fund managers have no material incentive to move 
the timing of their trades. Both of these scenarios would tend to overstate the 
returns of copycat portfolios and understate the possible returns of the actual 
portfolio. 
 
Based on this methodology I intend to explore whether the effect of delay in 
disclosure has any economically material effect on returns of copycat funds vis-à-vis 
actual funds.  
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4. Empirical Results 
 
In this section I examine how a copycat portfolio performs compared to an 
actual portfolio. I review three different scenarios: delays of 90, 60, and 30 days 
before the manager of the actual fund is required to disclose holdings information.   
 
In Table 5 through Table 7, I illustrate the difference in performance between an 
actual portfolio and a copycat portfolio with these three delay periods based on 
multiple buy-and-hold return (BHR) scenarios. I calculate the performance of the 
actual portfolio from data provided by Morningstar. The copycat portfolio is based 
on the holdings of the actual portfolio, postponed by the appropriate delay period 
(i.e. disclosing with a 90-, 60-, or 30-day delay from the end of every quarter). To 
calculate the returns for the copycat portfolio, I take the weighted average of the 
returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings. BHR[0,1] represents the one-
month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure; BHR[0,2] represents the two-
month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure; and BHR[0,3] represents the three-
month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. Similarly, RET[0,1] represents the 
monthly return one month after the disclosure. Panel A shows the mean, median, 
minimum, and maximum of returns from 1995 to 2004. I conduct a t-test for means 
and Wilcoxon tests for medians in order to determine whether the differences 
among groups are significant. T-values and P-values are associated with a two-sided 
t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  I will further discuss these 
tables in the next subsections. 
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<Insert Table 5> 
<Insert Table 6> 
<Insert Table 7> 
 
4.1. Does Delay in Mutual Fund Holdings Matter: An Aggregate View 
 
In this section I examine whether mutual fund investors should be concerned 
about the particular number of days of delay in disclosure of portfolio holdings. 
 
In Table 5, I observe that, with a 90-day delay in disclosure, actual portfolio returns 
are higher than the copycat portfolio for the one-month buy-and hold time frame. 
The one-month buy-and-hold return difference on average is 0.56%, while the 
three-month buy-and-hold return difference is only 0.39%. The point to note is not 
necessarily the magnitude, but that the actual portfolio returns are higher than the 
copycat portfolio returns. This analysis shows that having a 90-day delay in holdings 
disclosure is not detrimental to the mutual fund investor. 
 
As shown in Table 6, the actual portfolio returns are also higher than the copycat 
portfolio returns across all buy-and-hold time frames when a 60-day delay in 
disclosure is used. However, the average difference between actual portfolio returns 
and copycat portfolio returns are smaller with 60-day delay than with a 90-day 
delay, based on a one-month buy-and-hold strategy.  On average the actual portfolio 
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returns are higher than the copycat portfolio returns by 0.26% for a one-month buy-
and-hold strategy. This is lower than the 0.56% that was observed with a 90-day 
delay in disclosure. We observe that across all the buy-and-hold return time frames 
the actual portfolio returns were higher than those of the copycat portfolio. This 
analysis shows that the 60-day delay helps maintain the advantage of the actual 
portfolio over the copycat portfolio.  Next I see if one could further reduce the 
number of days before mutual fund portfolio holdings are declared down to 30 days. 
 
Could one further reduce the number of days before mutual fund portfolio holdings 
are declared?  Table 7 shows that with a 30-day delay, the actual portfolio no longer 
outperforms the copycat. The copycat portfolio returns are higher than the actual 
portfolio returns by 0.54% for a one-month buy-and-hold strategy and remain 
higher for the two-month buy-and-hold return strategy. On average, the difference 
in returns is statistically significant even though the magnitude is small for both the 
one- and two-month buy-and-hold strategies. This indicates that reducing the delay 
in mutual fund portfolio holdings disclosure to 30 days is not in the interest of 
mutual fund investors. 
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4.2. Does Copying the Best Pay Off? 
 
The previous section presented results at an aggregate level. In this section I 
examine whether copycat portfolio returns display a different pattern when the 
entire sample is segmented by past annual performance. If one were to create a 
copycat portfolio, one would prefer to copy a fund with good performance. It is 
therefore of interest to see if past fund performance has any bearing on the results. I 
divide the funds into three groups—a high-performance group, a medium-
performance group, and a low-performance group—based on the actual portfolio’s 
returns for the previous year37. I hypothesize that in the high-performance group 
the actual portfolio returns will be higher than the copycat portfolio returns across 
all delay scenarios. Table 8 shows the results for the three performance groups. 
 
In the high-performance class, the actual portfolio returns are higher than the 
copycat portfolio returns across all buy-and-hold periods considered as also across 
90-, and 60- delays. This suggests that only under the quickest disclosure regime (30 
days), it is possible for the copycat portfolio returns to exceed the returns for an 
actual portfolio in the high-performance class. This result provides support to the 
argument that the earliest disclosure regime should have a 60-day delay.  
 
                                                 
37 For each year, I rank the initial data of actual portfolios based on the annual return of the funds 
using prior calendar year information.  Then, I indentify the cutoffs to define the three groups; high-
performance group (top 33.33% of the initial data), medium-performance group, and low-
performance group (i.e. bottom 33.33% of the initial data).  Lastly, I apply the cutoffs to the final 
sample, and categorize them into three groups based on the performance of each year.  
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In the low-performance group, on the other hand, the difference in average returns 
of the actual portfolio and the copycat portfolio falls as the delay becomes shorter: 
from 0.28% with a 90-day delay to -0.88% with a 30-day delay for a one-month buy-
and-hold strategy. More attention should be paid to the one-month buy-and-hold 
strategy than other time frames because investment decisions in subsequent 
months could negatively impact actual portfolio returns only. 
 
Table 8 shows some interesting differences between the performance groups. 
Longer delays in disclosure lead to a larger difference between the performance of 
the actual portfolio and the copycat portfolio across all performance groups. For a 
90-day delay and a one-month buy-and-hold return strategy, actual portfolio 
returns are higher than copycat portfolio returns by 0.79% for the high-
performance group and 0.28% for the low-performance group. This would suggest 
that the varying time of delay in disclosure has a disproportionate impact on the 
high-performance group. For a 30-day delay, copycat portfolio returns exceed actual 
portfolio returns in the low-performance group by 0.88%and in the medium 
performance group by 0.55%, but actual portfolio returns are higher than copycat 
portfolio returns for all longer delays.  
 
The results indicate that reducing delay in disclosure to 30 days would be 
detrimental to investors in low- or medium-performance funds. If you were an 
investor in these funds, however, you would probably have more pressing concerns 
than copycat funds. 
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<Insert Table 8> 
 
 
4.3. Effect of Fund Size on Copycat Returns 
 
In this section I examine whether fund size has any effect on copycat 
portfolio returns. I hypothesize that the effect of delay in disclosure would have a 
more detrimental impact on large funds than on small funds38. It would take many 
trades for the composition of a large fund to change materially, and the time 
required for a large fund to make significant changes is dependent on the liquidity of 
the stock in the general market. Small funds, on the other hand, can change the 
composition of their funds very quickly.  I also examine whether a 30-day delay in 
disclosure causes negative impacts across all fund sizes. The entire dataset is 
classified into large, medium, and small funds based on the size of assets under 
management from the previous year. 
 
The results in Table 9 provide support for this argument. For large funds with a one-
month buy-and-hold strategy, returns vary based on the length of the delay period: 
                                                 
38 For each year, I rank the initial data of actual portfolios based on the total market value of the 
funds using prior year-end information.   Then, I indentify the cutoffs to define the three groups; 
large-size group (top 33.33% of the initial data), medium-size group, and small-size group (i.e. 
bottom 33.33% of initial data).  Lastly, I apply the cutoffs to the final sample, and categorize them 
into three groups based on the fund size of each year. 
For each year, I rank the sample of actual portfolios based on the total market value of the funds 
using prior year-end information. Then I divide the sample into three groups; large-size group (top 
33.33% of the sample), medium-size group, and small-size group (i.e. bottom 33.33 of the sample). 
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the actual portfolio returns underperform the copycat portfolio returns by 0.49% 
for a 30-day delay in disclosure, while for a 90-day delay in disclosure the actual 
portfolio returns outperform the copycat portfolio returns by 0.48%. Both results 
are statistically significant. For small funds with a one-month buy-and-hold strategy 
and a 30-day delay in disclosure, the actual portfolio returns are less than the 
copycat portfolio returns by a statistically significant 0.64%. When the delay in 
disclosure is increased to 90 days for small funds, actual portfolio returns are higher 
than copycat portfolio returns by 0.63%, decreasing to 0.28% for a 60-day delay in 
disclosure. We see that large, medium and small funds are all indeed are more prone 
to underperform   copycat funds when information is disclosed with a 30-day delay. 
However, Figure 3 shows that irrespective of fund size a 30-day delay in disclosure 
results in actual portfolio returns being less than copycat portfolio returns. Using a 
30-day delay would clearly be detrimental to investors in mutual funds. 
 
<Insert Table 9> 
<Insert Table 11> 
<Insert Figure 3> 
 
4.4. 90-Day or 30-Day Delay? Are the Differences Material? 
 
In this section I investigate whether the disparity between actual portfolio 
returns and copycat portfolio returns is different if one uses a 90- or 30-day delay. 
The analysis is done on an aggregate basis and also on a segmented basis. 
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From Table 10, Panel A, we can see that on average the actual portfolio returns are 
less than the copycat portfolio returns for the one month buy-and-hold time periods 
for a 30-day delay, while the actual portfolio returns are higher than the copycat 
portfolio returns on an aggregate basis for a 90-day delay. We also see that the 
difference for a one-month buy-and-hold strategy is 1.10% and it is statistically 
significant.  
 
In Table 10, Panel B.1, I break up the sample into high-, medium-, low-performance 
groups based on past annual performance. Copycat funds tend to outperform actual 
funds in the medium- and low-performance categories when using a 30-day delay in 
disclosure. In the medium-performance group, for a one-month buy-and-hold return 
strategy and a 30-day delay, the average underperformance is by 0.55%. For the 
same group based on a 90-day delay, there is an outperformance of 0.54%. The 
difference in returns between the two delay periods is statistically significant.  
 
The three-month buy-and-hold return strategy for the low-performance group leads 
to the actual fund underperforming the copycat fund by 0.42% with a 90-day delay. 
This underperformance is less than  with a 30-day delay, which is 0.58%. All other 
data from Panel B.1 indicates that using a 30-day delay negatively affects investors 
in a mutual fund irrespective of the past performance of the mutual fund. 
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I also examine what effect a 90-day delay or a 30-day delay has on the difference in 
actual portfolio returns and copycat portfolio returns when the funds are grouped 
by size. Table 10, Panel B.2, shows that for a 30-day delay the actual portfolio 
returns are less than the copycat portfolio returns across all size categories for the 
one month buy-and-hold return. On the other hand, Panel B.2 shows that for a 90-
day delay the actual portfolio returns are higher than the copycat portfolio returns 
across all size categories for the one month buy-and-hold return. As also the 
differences are statistically significant, which would suggest that a 30-day delay in 
portfolio disclosure is not in the interest of investors, irrespective of which size of 
fund they invest in. 
 
<Insert Table 10> 
 
4.5. Robustness Tests: Multiple Share Classes in Funds 
 
In my dataset, mutual fund returns are available for multiple share classes. 
Different share classes have different fee structures. Information about fee 
structures is not consistently available, and not all mutual funds have multiple share 
classes. Thus it is not possible to compare all mutual funds across a consistent share 
class. Hence I conduct robustness tests to see if the results are stable under different 
share classes. To illustrate the problem, consider two mutual funds: Fund X and 
Fund Y. Fund X has three share classes, namely Class I (institutional class), Class A 
(retail class with a high minimum investment), and Class B (retail class with a low 
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minimum investment), but only net returns are available for each share class. The 
highest returns for a given time are Class I shares, while the retail class shares have 
lower returns; therefore Class I shares have lower fee structures than retail class 
shares in either Class A or Class B. But Fund Y has only one share class: Class F. Only 
net returns are available for this share class. Since I don’t know the classification of 
this share class or the fees they charge, I cannot determine which share class 
returns of Fund X should be compared with Fund Y share Class F. 
 
To be as consistent as possible, I did the entire analysis on the highest returns 
(highest SECID) among various share classes for every fund for any given quarter. 
The funds with the highest SECID would be institutional class share returns, while 
those with the lowest SECID would be retail class share returns. In the example of 
Fund X and Fund Y, I would be using returns of Class I for Fund X and Class F for 
Fund Y. This assumes that Class F returns are institutional class returns. To account 
for the possibility that Class F of Fund Y is actually a retail class, I also did the entire 
analysis using returns based on Class B returns of Fund X and Class F returns of 
Fund Y.  
 
In general, all of the results with the lowest SECID (lowest returns and thus highest 
fees for a given time frame) are consistent with the previous results with the highest 
SECID (highest returns and thus lowest fees for a given time frame). Appendix A 
provides the entire set of tables with this alternative measure (the lowest SECID) for 
the actual fund returns. Based on the results from these robustness tests, I conclude 
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that the magnitude of the results varies slightly, but the difference is statistically 
immaterial. In other words, the main results stay consistent and stable irrespective 
of share class used.  
 
I also look at using median returns as well as using mean returns for comparing 
actual portfolio returns to copycat portfolio returns for all 90-day, 60-day as well as 
30-day delay and conclude that even if the magnitude of the difference may vary but 
the directionality of the result does not. Hence I still reach similar conclusions about 
the appropriate delay in disclosure should be 60 days. 
 
I also look at how high does copycat expense have to rise on an annual basis for a 
mutual fund operator to capture the entire benefit of having a copycat fund without 
benefitting investors in the copycat fund. The expense would have to be higher than 
560 bps annually. At this point the actual portfolio returns are always higher than 
copycat returns irrespective of 30-day, 60-day or 90-day delay. It also indicates that 
unless the copycat funds charge these fees, mutual fund investors would be 
negatively impacted by copycat funds. 
 
In sum, I come to the same conclusion: significant evidence suggests that disclosing 
portfolio holdings data with a 30-day delay is detrimental to the interest of the 
mutual fund investors. This result holds true even when we look at funds with 
varied performance as well as different sizes and across multiple share classes. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The timing of mutual fund portfolio disclosure has been revisited many times 
since the first disclosure rules were established under Investment Company Act, in 
1940.  This study attempts to identify the impact of different disclosure regimes for 
mutual funds holdings information.  The holdings data analyzed in this study covers 
more than 3,000 equity mutual funds during the time period from 1995 to 2004.  I 
examine the effect of varying delays in the disclosure of holdings information by 
comparing the returns of actual portfolios to the returns of copycat portfolios.  
Overall, I conclude that the number of days of delay does have an economically 
material effect on the difference between the returns of actual portfolio. net of 
expenses and of copycat portfolio, net of expenses. The entire analysis focuses on 
the significance of the potential cost of predatory trading associated with the 
various delays in disclosure of portfolio holdings. I have not considered the 
potential benefits or other costs that could be associated with the various delays in 
disclosure of portfolio holdings.  
 
For a 60-day delay in disclosure, I find that the returns of the actual portfolio are 
higher than the returns of the copycat portfolio across all buy-and-hold return 
strategies. This result leads me to conclude that the law39 regarding holdings 
disclosure as it currently stands does not harm mutual fund investors. I also 
                                                 
39 SEC Release Nos. 33-8393; 34-49333; IC-26372 (May 10, 2004) (“Portfolio Disclosure Release”) 
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primarily focus on the one month buy-and-hold time period given that it is least 
affected by investment decisions between disclosures.  It would be reasonable to 
assume that if one were to create a copycat fund it would not be based on the funds 
that have underperformed the vast majority of their peers. I find that the results 
stay consistent irrespective of share class used (i.e., the lowest SECIDs or the highest 
SECIDs). Accordingly, it seems that the current rules regarding the 60-day delay in 
disclosure generally protect investors in actively managed funds from predatory 
practices of professional traders.   
 
However, with a 90-day delay in disclosure, the results provide the largest 
difference in returns between the actual portfolio and the copycat portfolio. The 
results imply that using a 90-day delay in disclosure will provide active investors 
much better protection, irrespective of the share class in which one is invested.  
  
For a 30-day delay in disclosure, I find that actual portfolio returns are less than 
copycat portfolio returns on an aggregate level. In the high/medium/low-
performance group, the actual portfolio returns are less than copycat portfolio 
returns The results is similar when the analysis is done by fund size. I find that, 
across all fund size groups (i.e., large, medium, and small funds), a 30-day delay in 
disclosure is detrimental to the mutual fund investor. The qualitative impact on the 
decisions of investors of a delay longer than 30 days—the length suggested by many 
petitioners during the public comment period—is hard to quantify. However, from a 
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quantitative perspective, a 30-day delay in mutual fund holding information is not in 
the interest of investors in actively managed funds. 
 
In sum, I conclude that having a 30-day delay in disclosure is not a feasible option. 
As the SEC acknowledged, a balance must be struck between the investors’ interest 
in more frequent portfolio holdings disclosures, and the cost associated with 
disclosing and making that information available to investors—a cost that is 
ultimately borne by investors. 
 
I acknowledge that there are still more questions to be answered. The effect of these 
disclosure rules on those investors who are invested in bond funds, balanced funds, 
life-cycle funds, or even equity funds benchmarked to other specialized indices is an 
open question. While many have made impassioned comments on increased public 
disclosure over time, this paper provides quantitative analysis to help create 
effective public disclosure policy.  
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Figure I: Timeline for Copycat Funds 
 
Panel A. 90-day delay: March-end disclosure 
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Panel B. 60-day delay: March-end disclosure 
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Panel C. 30-day delay: March-end disclosure 
March 
End   
April  
End   
May 
End   
June 
End   
July 
End 
                            
                            
                            
                            
Actual 
Portfolio   
30-day 
delayed                   
      
Actual 
Portfolio                   
      Disclosure                   
                            
        BHR [0,1]               
                            
        BHR [0,2]         
                            
        BHR [0,3]   
 
 
95 
 
 
Figure 2. Actual funds vs. Copycat funds: 90/60/30-day delay 
 
This figure describes the difference in performance between the Actual Portfolio and the Copycat 
Portfolio. The Copycat Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio, disclosed with 
a delay of 90, 60, or 30 days after every quarter. Performance of the Actual Portfolio is retrieved from 
the Morningstar database. The Copycat Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, 
cash, and other holdings. Equity returns are calculated from CRSP based on the holdings information 
of each fund. Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (now, Barclays aggregate 
bond index) returns. Cash returns are based on one-month Treasury returns. Other returns are based 
on one-month Treasury returns. BHR[0,1] mean represents the average difference in one-month buy-
and-hold returns after the disclosure between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio.  BHR[0,1] 
median represents the median difference in one-month buy-and-hold returns after the disclosure 
between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio.  The supporting data are from Table 5, Table 6 and 
Table 7. 
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Figure 3. Actual funds vs. Copycat funds by Group: 90/60/30-day delay 
 
This figure describes the difference in returns between the Actual Portfolio and the Copycat Portfolio. 
This analysis uses the one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure, BHR[0,1]. The Copycat 
Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the actual portfolio, disclosed with a delay of 90, 60, or 
30 days after every quarter. In Panel A, the portfolios are grouped by the performance of actual 
portfolio for every year. The high-performance group consists of actual funds that were top players 
of the year. The low-performance group consists of actual funds that were bottom players of the year. 
The medium-performance group consists of the rest of funds. In Panel B, the portfolios are grouped 
by the fund size of Actual Portfolio for every year. The large size group consists of actual funds whose 
fund size was at the top of the year. The small size group consists of actual funds whose fund size was 
at the bottom of the year. The medium size group consists of the rest of funds. The supporting data 
are from Table 8 and Table 9. 
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TABLE 1. Sample Description Without Restriction 
 
This table describes the portfolio structure of the initial sample during the period from 1995 to 2004. The fund portfolios contain equities, 
bonds, cash and others (convertibles).  Number of Fund is the total number of funds that are available during the given time period.  Each 
column represents the percentage of holdings of equity, bond, cash, and others.  Panel A shows the mean weight and the median weight of each 
component from 1995 to 2004.  Panel B shows the mean weight and the median weight of each component for each quarter end from 1995 to 
2004.  Panel C shows the mean weight and the median weight of each component for each quarter end of each year from 1995 to 2004. 
 
PANEL A. YEAR 1995 – 2004         
Portfolio Year   Number  Mean       Median       
   of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
Year 1995-2004   3,740 94.27 1.09 4.72 0.09 97.28 0.00 2.26 0.00 
           
PANEL B. BY QUARTER          
Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median       
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
Year 1995-2004 3   94.26 1.16 4.58 0.10 97.29 0.00 2.16 0.00 
 6   94.19 1.06 4.72 0.09 97.25 0.00 2.24 0.00 
 9   94.13 1.12 4.84 0.08 97.25 0.00 2.34 0.00 
 12   94.50 1.02 4.75 0.10 97.33 0.00 2.27 0.00 
           
PANEL C. BY YEAR AND QUARTER         
Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median       
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
1995 3 460 95.88 3.84 0.26 0.02 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 6 599 94.94 2.62 2.41 0.03 99.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 9 440 91.79 2.66 5.46 0.08 95.62 0.00 2.77 0.00 
 12 598 91.07 2.04 6.84 0.05 94.35 0.00 4.09 0.00 
1996 3 453 91.53 2.03 6.59 0.07 94.45 0.00 4.30 0.00 
 6 610 91.18 1.82 7.12 0.05 94.44 0.00 4.19 0.00 
 9 676 91.65 1.95 6.33 0.07 95.27 0.00 3.64 0.00 
 12 832 92.63 1.43 5.80 0.14 95.75 0.00 3.43 0.00 
1997 3 705 91.69 1.63 6.60 0.07 94.70 0.00 4.05 0.00 
 6 931 92.85 1.46 5.83 0.08 95.55 0.00 3.76 0.00 
 9 938 93.05 1.64 5.35 0.06 95.82 0.00 3.56 0.00 
 12 1116 92.98 1.34 5.71 0.06 95.64 0.00 3.61 0.00 
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Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median       
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
1998 3 1098 93.71 1.27 5.18 0.03 96.24 0.00 3.10 0.00 
 6 1323 93.26 1.28 5.44 0.03 95.93 0.00 3.56 0.00 
 9 1334 92.25 1.42 6.36 0.04 95.16 0.00 4.34 0.00 
 12 1442 93.41 1.44 5.19 0.03 96.21 0.00 3.28 0.00 
1999 3 1264 93.74 1.30 4.94 0.03 96.59 0.00 3.03 0.00 
 6 1311 93.90 1.09 5.00 0.01 96.25 0.00 3.37 0.00 
 9 1256 94.10 1.26 4.69 0.02 96.91 0.00 2.72 0.00 
 12 1464 94.64 1.00 4.34 0.02 96.96 0.00 2.68 0.00 
2000 3 1493 94.37 1.05 4.71 0.02 96.95 0.00 2.69 0.00 
 6 1540 94.39 0.90 4.68 0.02 96.70 0.00 3.13 0.00 
 9 1617 94.62 0.79 4.58 0.01 96.62 0.00 3.11 0.00 
 12 1828 93.66 1.03 5.35 0.02 96.11 0.00 3.49 0.00 
2001 3 1879 93.32 1.19 5.66 0.01 96.33 0.00 3.31 0.00 
 6 2016 94.07 0.92 5.14 0.01 96.64 0.00 3.03 0.00 
 9 1940 93.92 1.36 5.52 0.01 96.81 0.00 3.01 0.00 
 12 1969 94.65 0.82 4.57 0.04 97.00 0.00 2.80 0.00 
2002 3 2099 94.21 1.53 4.02 0.25 96.98 0.00 1.89 0.00 
 6 2459 93.85 1.59 4.29 0.27 97.05 0.00 1.78 0.00 
 9 2507 93.64 1.45 4.68 0.26 96.99 0.00 2.12 0.00 
 12 2604 94.30 1.30 4.02 0.39 97.55 0.00 1.52 0.00 
2003 3 2720 94.82 0.67 4.38 0.16 97.70 0.00 1.93 0.00 
 6 2772 94.82 0.58 4.49 0.13 98.22 0.00 1.51 0.00 
 9 2710 95.13 0.58 4.24 0.12 98.30 0.00 1.49 0.00 
 12 2625 95.11 0.59 4.30 0.10 98.44 0.00 1.43 0.00 
2004 3 2717 95.63 0.55 3.84 0.12 98.84 0.00 1.01 0.00 
 6 2748 95.41 0.50 4.14 0.08 98.90 0.00 0.95 0.00 
 9 2688 95.77 0.52 3.92 0.00 98.84 0.00 1.04 0.00 
 12 2663 97.05 0.61 4.40 0.01 98.89 0.00 1.03 0.00 
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TABLE 2. Sample Description with Restriction of Complete Data (99% Rule) 
 
For the complete analysis, we include those funds with complete disclosure in Morningstar database from the initial sample.  In order to identify those 
funds with complete disclosure, we add up the percentage of equity, bond, cash and other components (convertibles) in the fund, and accept only those 
funds with total weight of 99% or higher in equities, bonds and cash. Number of Fund is the total number of funds that are available during the given time 
period.  Each column represents the percentage of holdings of equity, bond, cash, and others.  Panel A shows the mean weight and the median weight of 
each component from 1995 to 2004.  Panel B shows the mean weight and the median weight of each component for each quarter end from 1995 to 2004.  
Panel C shows the mean weight and the median weight of each component for each quarter end of each year from 1995 to 2004.  
            
PANEL A. YEAR 1995 – 2004          
Portfolio Year  Number  Mean       Median        
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others  
Year 1995-2004  3672 94.28 1.09 4.72 0.09 97.28 0.00 2.26 0.00  
            
PANEL B. BY QUARTER           
Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median        
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others  
Year 1995-2004 3   94.26 1.16 4.58 0.10 97.29 0.00 2.16 0.00  
 6   94.20 1.06 4.71 0.09 97.25 0.00 2.24 0.00  
 9   94.13 1.12 4.84 0.08 97.25 0.00 2.35 0.00  
 12   94.51 1.02 4.74 0.10 97.34 0.00 2.27 0.00  
            
PANEL C. BY YEAR AND QUARTER          
Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median        
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others  
1995 3 460 95.88 3.84 0.26 0.02 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
 6 599 94.94 2.62 2.41 0.03 99.81 0.00 0.00 0.00  
 9 440 91.79 2.66 5.46 0.08 95.62 0.00 2.77 0.00  
 12 598 91.07 2.04 6.84 0.05 94.35 0.00 4.09 0.00  
1996 3 453 91.53 2.03 6.59 0.07 94.45 0.00 4.30 0.00  
 6 610 91.18 1.82 7.12 0.05 94.44 0.00 4.19 0.00  
 9 676 91.65 1.95 6.33 0.07 95.27 0.00 3.64 0.00  
 12 832 92.63 1.43 5.80 0.14 95.75 0.00 3.43 0.00  
1997 3 705 91.69 1.63 6.60 0.07 94.70 0.00 4.05 0.00  
 6 931 92.85 1.46 5.83 0.08 95.55 0.00 3.76 0.00  
 9 938 93.05 1.64 5.35 0.06 95.82 0.00 3.56 0.00  
 12 1116 92.98 1.34 5.71 0.06 95.64 0.00 3.61 0.00  
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Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median        
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others  
1998 3 1098 93.71 1.27 5.18 0.03 96.24 0.00 3.10 0.00  
 6 1323 93.26 1.28 5.44 0.03 95.93 0.00 3.56 0.00  
 9 1334 92.25 1.42 6.36 0.04 95.16 0.00 4.34 0.00  
 12 1442 93.41 1.44 5.19 0.03 96.21 0.00 3.28 0.00  
1999 3 1264 93.74 1.30 4.94 0.03 96.59 0.00 3.03 0.00  
 6 1311 93.90 1.09 5.00 0.01 96.25 0.00 3.37 0.00  
 9 1256 94.10 1.26 4.69 0.02 96.91 0.00 2.72 0.00  
 12 1464 94.64 1.00 4.34 0.02 96.96 0.00 2.68 0.00  
2000 3 1493 94.37 1.05 4.71 0.02 96.95 0.00 2.69 0.00  
 6 1539 94.39 0.90 4.69 0.02 96.70 0.00 3.13 0.00  
 9 1616 94.63 0.78 4.58 0.01 96.63 0.00 3.11 0.00  
 12 1828 93.66 1.03 5.35 0.02 96.11 0.00 3.49 0.00  
2001 3 1875 93.32 1.19 5.67 0.01 96.33 0.00 3.31 0.00  
 6 2015 94.12 0.92 5.09 0.01 96.64 0.00 3.03 0.00  
 9 1940 93.92 1.36 5.52 0.01 96.81 0.00 3.01 0.00  
 12 1969 94.65 0.82 4.57 0.04 97.00 0.00 2.80 0.00  
2002 3 2098 94.21 1.53 4.02 0.25 96.97 0.00 1.89 0.00  
 6 2459 93.85 1.59 4.29 0.27 97.05 0.00 1.78 0.00  
 9 2507 93.64 1.45 4.68 0.26 96.99 0.00 2.12 0.00  
 12 2604 94.30 1.30 4.02 0.39 97.55 0.00 1.52 0.02  
2003 3 2720 94.82 0.67 4.38 0.16 97.70 0.00 1.93 0.00  
 6 2771 94.83 0.58 4.49 0.13 98.23 0.00 1.51 0.00  
 9 2710 95.13 0.58 4.24 0.12 98.30 0.00 1.49 0.00  
 12 2622 95.18 0.58 4.26 0.10 98.45 0.00 1.43 0.00  
2004 3 2714 95.65 0.55 3.84 0.12 98.84 0.00 1.01 0.00  
 6 2746 95.42 0.50 4.13 0.08 98.90 0.00 0.95 0.00  
 9 2678 95.77 0.52 3.93 0.00 98.84 0.00 1.05 0.00  
 12 2625 97.10 0.61 4.42 0.01 98.97 0.00 1.03 0.00  
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TABLE 3. Sample Description for Continuous Funds 
 
This table describes the portfolio structure of the funds that existed continuously during the period from 1995 to 2004. The fund portfolio 
includes equity, bond, cash, and others (convertibles).  Number of Fund is the total number of funds that are available during the given time 
period.  Each column represents the percentage of holdings of equity, bond, cash, and others.  Panel A shows the mean weight and the 
median weight of each component from 1995 to 2004.  Panel B shows the mean weight and the median weight of each component for each 
quarter end from 1995 to 2004.  Panel C shows the mean weight and the median weight of each component for each quarter end of each 
year from 1995 to 2004. 
 
PANEL A. YEAR 1995 – 2004         
Portfolio Year   Number  Mean       Median       
   of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
Year 1995-2004   40 95.79 0.09 4.14 0.02 97.20 0.00 2.76 0.00 
           
PANEL B. BY QUARTER          
Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median       
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
Year 1995-2004 3   95.81 0.11 4.06 0.03 97.69 0.00 2.28 0.00 
 6   95.90 0.11 4.00 0.02 97.21 0.00 2.79 0.00 
 9   95.84 0.07 4.23 0.01 96.62 0.00 3.32 0.00 
 12   95.62 0.06 4.28 0.03 97.33 0.00 2.67 0.00 
           
PANEL C. BY YEAR AND QUARTER         
Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median       
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
1995 3 40 99.53 0.47 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 6 40 99.56 0.44 0.00 0.00 99.98 0.02 0.00 0.00 
 9 40 95.95 0.16 3.89 0.00 97.20 0.00 2.80 0.00 
 12 40 94.28 0.13 5.59 0.00 96.03 0.00 3.97 0.00 
1996 3 40 93.47 0.16 6.37 0.00 95.11 0.00 4.89 0.00 
 6 40 94.96 0.12 4.92 0.00 96.55 0.00 3.45 0.00 
 9 40 94.41 0.10 5.49 0.00 94.58 0.00 5.42 0.00 
 12 40 95.00 0.05 4.95 0.00 95.41 0.00 4.59 0.00 
1997 3 40 94.68 0.03 5.29 0.00 95.03 0.00 4.97 0.00 
 6 40 94.70 0.05 5.24 0.00 94.90 0.00 5.10 0.00 
 9 40 94.95 0.06 4.99 0.00 95.43 0.00 4.57 0.00 
 12 40 94.27 0.03 5.70 0.00 95.21 0.00 4.79 0.00 
102 
 
 
Portfolio Year Portfolio Month Number  Mean       Median       
  of Fund Equity Bond Cash Others Equity Bond Cash Others 
1998 3 40 95.18 0.02 4.80 0.00 96.56 0.00 3.42 0.00 
 6 40 94.84 0.05 5.11 0.00 96.15 0.00 3.85 0.00 
 9 40 94.60 0.05 5.41 0.00 94.96 0.00 5.04 0.00 
 12 40 95.15 0.05 4.80 0.00 95.69 0.00 4.31 0.00 
1999 3 40 95.18 0.05 4.77 0.00 96.84 0.00 3.16 0.00 
 6 40 95.10 0.08 4.82 0.00 95.79 0.00 4.21 0.00 
 9 40 95.14 0.07 4.79 0.00 96.82 0.00 3.18 0.00 
 12 40 95.47 0.10 4.42 0.00 98.08 0.00 1.92 0.00 
2000 3 40 95.56 0.11 4.33 0.00 97.36 0.00 2.64 0.00 
 6 40 95.20 0.12 4.68 0.00 97.64 0.00 2.36 0.00 
 9 40 94.79 0.09 5.12 0.00 96.14 0.00 3.86 0.00 
 12 40 94.92 0.07 5.01 0.00 98.41 0.00 1.59 0.00 
2001 3 40 95.65 0.08 4.26 0.00 97.72 0.00 2.28 0.00 
 6 40 95.34 0.06 4.86 0.00 95.63 0.00 4.46 0.00 
 9 40 97.80 0.04 3.62 0.00 99.53 0.00 1.96 0.00 
 12 40 95.92 0.04 4.04 0.00 97.64 0.00 2.36 0.00 
2002 3 40 95.67 0.13 4.11 0.09 97.23 0.01 2.47 0.00 
 6 40 96.03 0.13 3.71 0.13 97.30 0.01 2.47 0.00 
 9 40 96.28 0.13 3.52 0.06 97.07 0.03 2.67 0.00 
 12 40 95.61 0.14 3.95 0.30 97.03 0.01 2.68 0.02 
2003 3 40 96.08 0.03 3.80 0.09 97.62 0.00 2.38 0.00 
 6 40 95.76 0.02 4.15 0.07 96.75 0.00 3.14 0.00 
 9 40 96.01 0.02 3.97 0.06 96.33 0.00 3.67 0.00 
 12 40 97.22 0.01 2.77 0.02 98.33 0.00 1.67 0.00 
2004 3 40 97.14 0.00 2.86 0.13 98.35 0.00 1.65 0.00 
 6 40 97.49 0.01 2.50 0.01 98.27 0.00 1.73 0.00 
 9 40 98.46 0.02 1.52 0.00 99.63 0.00 0.35 0.00 
 12 40 98.35 0.02 1.59 0.00 99.77 0.00 0.23 0.00 
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TABLE 4. Actual Return – High SECID vs. Low SECID 
 
This table describes the actual return sample in terms of annual actual returns.  Because the majority of actual return data has multiple-SECID per 
FUNDID, we compare the returns of SECID with the highest returns to the one with the lowest returns.  Panel A summarizes all available actual return 
data including single-SECID funds and multiple-SECID funds during the period from 1995 to 2004.  In Panel B, we show the same information as Panel A 
on an annual basis.  Panel C includes only multiple-SECID funds during the period of 1995 to 2004.  Panel D describes the same information as Panel C 
for each year.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values and P-
values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  
 ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Panel A. All Year Annual Return                   
  Returns with Highest SECID Returns with Lowest SECID Difference 
Years N Mean Median Min Max N Mean Median Min Max Mean t-value   
1995  
- 
2004 16898 9.15 12.15 -321.60 271.36 16898 8.16 11.42 -321.60 271.36 0.98 4.26 ** 
 
              
Panel B. By Year Annual Return                   
  Returns with Highest SECID Returns with Lowest SECID Difference 
Year N Mean Median Min Max N Mean Median Min Max Mean t-value   
1995 818 28.23 28.88 -23.58 111.81 818 27.54 27.99 -23.60 111.81 0.68 1.72 * 
1996 812 19.18 19.31 -15.00 58.32 812 18.52 18.83 -15.00 57.08 0.66 2.24 ** 
1997 924 24.47 25.72 -49.08 50.63 924 23.75 25.14 -49.08 50.63 0.72 1.90 * 
1998 1,091 23.73 22.23 -31.62 255.06 1,091 22.76 20.87 -32.56 255.06 0.97 1.17  
1999 1,205 22.86 19.56 -24.36 192.12 1,205 21.79 18.85 -25.46 192.12 1.06 1.21  
2000 1,409 -4.03 -4.00 -321.60 271.36 1,409 -5.41 -5.19 -321.60 271.36 1.38 1.43  
2001 1,637 -10.17 -10.79 -90.99 93.96 1,637 -11.53 -11.33 -104.84 92.28 1.36 2.25 ** 
2002 1,718 -23.05 -22.88 -137.04 68.16 1,718 -24.51 -23.77 -176.34 68.16 1.46 3.03 ** 
2003 1,798 21.93 21.84 -163.80 95.52 1,798 20.92 21.10 -163.80 95.52 1.00 2.14 ** 
2004 1,804 12.76 11.98 -42.43 84.36 1,804 11.98 11.35 -42.43 83.04 0.78 2.46 ** 
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Panel C. All Year Annual Return - Multiple SEDID only             
a  Returns with Highest SECID Returns with Lowest SECID Difference 
Years N Mean Median Min Max N Mean Median Min Max Mean t-value   
1995 
to 
2004 13501 7.46 10.59 -209.96 167.92 13501 6.23 9.59 -211.64 149.64 1.23 5.14 ** 
              
Panel D. By Year Annual Return - Multiple SEDID only             
  Returns with Highest SECID Returns with Lowest SECID Difference 
Year N Mean Median Min Max N Mean Median Min Max Mean t-value   
1995 540 28.22 28.94 -23.58 70.96 540 27.19 27.76 -23.60 70.89 1.03 2.41 ** 
1996 551 18.87 19.13 -13.75 58.32 551 17.90 18.25 -13.75 57.08 0.98 2.75 ** 
1997 684 24.55 25.54 -13.04 50.63 684 23.58 24.71 -16.52 50.63 0.97 2.58 ** 
1998 812 21.05 20.67 -31.62 148.56 812 19.75 19.10 -32.56 148.08 1.30 1.82 * 
1999 867 20.12 17.61 -24.36 167.92 867 18.64 16.25 -25.46 144.30 1.48 1.55  
2000 1,219 -4.29 -4.25 -209.96 152.52 1,219 -5.88 -5.82 -211.64 149.64 1.59 1.93 ** 
2001 1,468 -11.05 -10.85 -90.99 93.96 1,468 -12.56 -11.44 -104.84 88.38 1.51 2.83 ** 
2002 1,510 -22.30 -22.75 -93.66 68.16 1,510 -23.96 -23.73 -176.34 68.16 1.66 3.83 ** 
2003 1,347 22.12 21.97 -90.96 82.44 1,347 20.78 20.98 -93.48 81.36 1.34 3.02 ** 
2004 1,403 11.83 11.77 -23.02 84.36 1,403 10.83 10.73 -25.11 83.04 1.00 3.16 ** 
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Table 5. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: 90-day delay 
 
This table describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio. 
The Copycat Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio which are disclosed with 
90-day delay every quarter.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  
Copycat Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity 
returns are calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are 
based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns 
are based on one-month treasury return.  Other returns are based on one-month treasury return 
BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-
month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-and-hold 
return after the disclosure.  N represents the number of fund-quarters available.  Panel A shows the 
mean and median of returns from 1995 to 2004.  Panel B shows the mean and median of returns for 
each year from 1995 to 2004.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order 
to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values are associated with two-sided t-test of 
no difference in mean between two groups.  P-values are associated with wilcoxon test of no 
difference in median between two groups. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, and 10% 
levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. All-90 day delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Years Returns     N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value 
 
Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]        10,434  1.38 1.55 0.82 0.97 0.56 14.70 ** 0.00 ** 
- BHR [0,2]        10,434  1.51 1.58 1.64 1.58 -0.13 -2.12 ** 0.03 ** 
2004 BHR [0,3]        10,434  2.16 3.00 1.76 2.27 0.39 4.82 ** 0.00 ** 
Panel B. By year-90 day delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
   
Year Returns      N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value   
Median-
Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]             468  1.68 1.63 1.25 1.16 0.43 4.87 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             468  4.12 3.95 3.01 2.93 1.12 11.52 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             468  5.09 5.17 3.54 3.71 1.54 12.70 ** 0.00 ** 
1996 BHR [0,1]             586  2.25 2.29 1.78 1.70 0.47 3.64 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             586  6.58 6.54 5.09 5.07 1.49 7.92 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             586  7.52 7.49 5.68 5.68 1.84 8.04 ** 0.00 ** 
1997 BHR [0,1]             712  0.92 1.05 0.75 0.77 0.17 1.60   0.04 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             712  1.78 2.11 1.48 1.59 0.30 2.37 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             712  5.32 5.63 3.72 3.85 1.60 8.73 ** 0.00 ** 
1998 BHR [0,1]             885  3.36 3.38 2.53 2.53 0.83 8.64 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             885  0.34 0.16 0.63 0.50 -0.29 -1.33   0.01 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             885  5.96 5.53 4.37 4.14 1.58 6.12 ** 0.00 ** 
1999 BHR [0,1]             992  -1.09 -0.95 -0.71 -0.60 -0.38 -3.58 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             992  -0.81 -0.96 -1.06 -1.02 0.25 1.28   0.64   
 
BHR [0,3]             992  3.15 2.21 2.10 1.57 1.05 3.65 ** 0.06 * 
2000 BHR [0,1]          1,160  2.48 2.32 3.09 2.76 -0.61 -4.21 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,160  0.00 0.21 0.35 0.49 -0.35 -1.51   0.23   
 
BHR [0,3]          1,160  -2.77 -2.94 -2.86 -2.79 0.08 0.28   0.73   
2001 BHR [0,1]          1,314  -1.40 -1.47 -1.10 -1.18 -0.29 -3.16 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,314  -1.53 -1.60 -0.95 -0.99 -0.58 -3.07 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,314  -3.95 -3.86 -3.16 -3.12 -0.79 -2.96 ** 0.00 ** 
2002 BHR [0,1]          1,381  1.81 1.53 1.88 1.66 -0.06 -0.60   0.08 * 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,381  3.90 3.29 4.93 4.42 -1.03 -6.30 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,381  0.86 -0.18 2.11 1.07 -1.25 -6.32 ** 0.00 ** 
2003 BHR [0,1]          1,478  2.80 2.79 1.87 1.84 0.93 19.91 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,478  3.68 3.60 3.48 3.33 0.20 2.87 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,478  4.43 4.52 4.53 4.49 -0.10 -1.38   0.85   
2004 BHR [0,1]          1,458  1.43 1.39 -1.78 -1.58 3.21 87.37 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,458  0.25 0.33 0.70 0.80 -0.45 -7.67 ** 0.00 ** 
  BHR [0,3]          1,458  2.89 2.92 1.83 1.79 1.05 14.28 ** 0.00 ** 
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Table 6. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: 60-day delay 
 
This table describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio. The 
Copycat Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio which are disclosed with 60-day 
delay every quarter.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Copycat 
Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are 
calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are based on Lehman 
Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month 
treasury return.  Other returns are based on one-month treasury return. BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-
and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the 
disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  N represents the 
number of fund-quarters available.  Panel A shows the mean and median of returns from 1995 to 2004.  Panel 
B shows the mean and median of returns for each year from 1995 to 2004.  We conduct t-test for means and 
wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values are 
associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  P-values are associated with 
wilcoxon test of no difference in median between two groups. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. All-60 day delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Years Returns      N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value 
 
Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]        10,445  0.47 0.97 0.21 0.84 0.26 5.16 ** 0.00 ** 
- BHR [0,2]        10,445  1.83 2.67 0.98 1.18 0.85 14.57 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,3]        10,445  1.93 2.55 1.78 2.33 0.15 2.12 ** 0.00 ** 
Panel B. By year-60 day delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
   Year Returns       N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value   Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]             466  2.08 2.14 1.45 1.55 0.63 9.42 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             466  3.79 3.67 2.73 2.62 1.06 9.55 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             466  6.28 6.19 4.52 4.57 1.77 14.25 ** 0.00 ** 
1996 BHR [0,1]             583  -0.68 -0.25 -0.52 -0.16 -0.17 -1.52   0.42   
 
BHR [0,2]             583  1.53 1.78 1.24 1.32 0.28 1.87 * 0.01 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             583  5.80 5.93 4.51 4.49 1.29 6.15 ** 0.00 ** 
1997 BHR [0,1]             711  3.94 3.90 2.62 2.65 1.32 20.24 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             711  4.88 4.88 3.39 3.36 1.49 14.04 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             711  5.73 5.98 4.11 4.20 1.61 13.93 ** 0.00 ** 
1998 BHR [0,1]             884  5.09 4.77 3.48 3.40 1.61 13.67 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             884  8.70 8.62 6.14 6.21 2.56 14.63 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             884  5.58 5.25 4.20 3.95 1.38 5.25 ** 0.00 ** 
1999 BHR [0,1]             992  4.48 4.34 3.77 3.62 0.70 5.25 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             992  3.23 3.26 2.97 3.02 0.26 1.83 * 0.01 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             992  3.60 3.08 2.65 2.48 0.96 3.82 ** 0.00 ** 
2000 BHR [0,1]          1,159  -1.72 -1.55 -1.61 -1.33 -0.11 -0.80   0.09 * 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,159  0.58 0.55 1.31 1.22 -0.73 -5.35 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,159  -1.70 -1.24 -1.25 -0.78 -0.45 -1.73 * 0.05 ** 
2001 BHR [0,1]          1,314  -1.59 -1.47 -1.44 -1.36 -0.15 -1.24   0.04 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,314  -3.14 -3.14 -2.73 -2.79 -0.41 -4.20 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,314  -3.50 -3.32 -2.79 -2.56 -0.71 -4.91 ** 0.00 ** 
2002 BHR [0,1]          1,386  -5.25 -5.41 -4.62 -4.83 -0.63 -7.22 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,386  -3.45 -4.03 -2.77 -3.29 -0.68 -4.66 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,386  -1.44 -2.39 0.14 -0.81 -1.58 -8.33 ** 0.00 ** 
2003 BHR [0,1]          1,490  0.71 0.81 0.80 0.89 -0.09 -2.45 ** 0.02 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,490  3.56 3.63 2.69 2.77 0.86 13.42 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,490  4.45 4.54 4.32 4.27 0.14 1.64 * 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,1]          1,460  1.97 1.96 1.41 1.34 0.56 16.94 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,460  3.45 3.37 -0.41 -0.34 3.86 76.95 ** 0.00 ** 
  BHR [0,3]          1,460  2.18 2.21 2.10 2.06 0.08 1.23   0.01 ** 
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Table 7. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: 30-day delay 
 
This table describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio. The Copycat 
Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio which are disclosed with 30-day delay every 
quarter.  Performance of actual portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Copycat portfolio is the 
weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP 
based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, 
Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month treasury return.  Other returns are 
based on one-month treasury return BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  
BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-
and-hold return after the disclosure.  N represents the number of fund-quarters available.  Panel A shows the 
mean and median of returns from 1995 to 2004.  Panel B shows mean and median of returns for each year from 
1995 to 2004.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among 
groups are significant.  t-values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two 
groups.  P-values are associated with wilcoxon test of no difference in median between two groups.  ** and * 
indicate statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. All-30 day delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Years Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value 
 
Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]        10,385  -0.04 0.09 0.50 1.07 -0.54 -11.08 ** 0.00 ** 
- BHR [0,2]        10,385  0.44 1.18 0.73 1.75 -0.29 -3.93 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,3]        10,385  1.74 2.39 1.45 1.76 0.29 3.86 ** 0.00 ** 
Panel B. By year-30 day delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Year Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value   Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]             466  2.17 2.22 1.47 1.52 0.70 10.08 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             466  4.29 4.35 2.97 3.03 1.32 13.14 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             466  6.06 6.08 4.29 4.27 1.77 11.14 ** 0.00 ** 
1996 BHR [0,1]             582  2.54 2.74 1.79 1.85 0.76 6.99 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             582  1.88 2.40 1.29 1.58 0.59 3.52 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             582  4.17 4.76 3.09 3.35 1.07 5.11 ** 0.00 ** 
1997 BHR [0,1]             702  3.23 3.09 2.44 2.33 0.78 6.95 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             702  7.28 7.17 5.14 4.98 2.14 17.29 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             702  8.38 8.37 6.00 5.87 2.38 12.19 ** 0.00 ** 
1998 BHR [0,1]             877  -3.61 -3.65 -2.59 -2.59 -1.02 -6.77 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             877  1.30 0.94 0.80 0.64 0.50 2.66 ** 0.02 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             877  4.67 4.33 3.29 3.05 1.39 6.52 ** 0.00 ** 
1999 BHR [0,1]             979  0.45 -0.39 0.35 -0.25 0.10 0.54   0.29   
 
BHR [0,2]             979  4.89 4.19 4.14 3.40 0.76 3.17 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             979  3.57 2.90 3.28 2.72 0.30 1.40   0.61   
2000 BHR [0,1]          1,153  -3.79 -3.07 -3.06 -2.33 -0.73 -3.27 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,153  -5.43 -4.70 -4.61 -3.83 -0.81 -2.92 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,153  -3.49 -3.20 -2.02 -1.66 -1.48 -6.36 ** 0.00 ** 
2001 BHR [0,1]          1,311  -0.24 -0.01 -0.30 -0.07 0.06 0.51   0.21   
 
BHR [0,2]          1,311  -1.66 -1.36 -1.54 -1.28 -0.12 -0.65   0.30   
 
BHR [0,3]          1,311  -3.26 -3.00 -2.88 -2.66 -0.38 -2.19 ** 0.01 ** 
2002 BHR [0,1]          1,370  -0.32 -0.12 0.72 0.78 -1.04 -17.06 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,370  -5.73 -5.76 -4.02 -4.18 -1.71 -19.80 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,370  -4.12 -4.41 -2.27 -2.74 -1.85 -13.91 ** 0.00 ** 
2003 BHR [0,1]          1,485  2.94 2.67 2.64 2.44 0.30 5.77 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,485  3.66 3.49 3.45 3.32 0.21 3.34 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,485  6.62 6.41 5.44 5.26 1.18 12.45 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,1]          1,460  -1.14 -0.89 1.88 1.85 -3.02 -68.43 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,460  0.89 1.12 3.31 3.23 -2.42 -37.19 ** 0.00 ** 
  BHR [0,3]          1,460  2.37 2.41 1.43 1.46 0.94 12.49 ** 0.00 ** 
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Table 8. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: Grouped by Actual Fund Annual Performance 
 
This table shows mean returns of the Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio from 1995 to 2004.  The portfolios are grouped by the performance of Actual 
Portfolio for every year.  High Performance Group consists of actual funds who were top players of the year.  Low Performance Group consists of actual 
funds who were bottom players of the year.  Average Performance Group consists of the rest of funds.  N is the total number of funds that are available 
during the given time period.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Performance of Copycat Portfolio is the weighted 
average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund Bond 
returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month treasury 
return.  Panel A describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed 
with 90-day delay by group.  Panel B describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio 
holdings are disclosed with 60-day delay by group.  Panel C describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio 
when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed with 30-day delay by group.  N represents the number of fund-quarters available.  BHR[0,1] represents 
one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents 
three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences 
among groups are significant.  t-values and P-values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
 Performance   Panel A. 90-DAY DELAY Panel B. 60-DAY DELAY Panel C. 30-DAY DELAY 
Group Returns Actual Copycat Diff t-value 
 
Actual Copycat Diff t-value 
 
Actual Copycat Diff t-value 
 
High 
performance BHR [0,1] 1.71 0.92 0.79 13.53 ** 1.30 0.86 0.45 5.49 ** 1.04 1.31 -0.27 -3.61 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 2.57 2.23 0.34 3.89 ** 3.02 1.75 1.27 13.42 ** 2.37 2.20 0.18 1.57 
 
 BHR [0,3] 4.25 3.19 1.06 8.85 ** 3.85 3.04 0.81 7.74 ** 4.05 3.04 1.01 8.80 ** 
Average 
performance BHR [0,1] 1.35 0.80 0.54 9.40 ** 0.33 0.09 0.24 2.95 ** -0.10 0.45 -0.55 -8.22 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 1.48 1.62 -0.14 -1.56 
 
1.65 0.85 0.80 8.63 ** 0.24 0.56 -0.32 -2.99 ** 
 BHR [0,3] 1.95 1.59 0.36 2.99 ** 1.76 1.65 0.10 0.98 
 
1.50 1.27 0.23 2.09 ** 
Low 
performance BHR [0,1] 1.01 0.73 0.28 3.39 ** -0.45 -0.49 0.05 0.49 
 
-1.35 -0.47 -0.88 -8.25 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 0.18 0.90 -0.72 -5.19 ** 0.52 0.16 0.36 3.29 ** -1.83 -0.97 -0.86 -5.59 ** 
 BHR [0,3] -0.28 0.14 -0.42 -2.40 ** -0.32 0.31 -0.63 -4.25 ** -0.98 -0.40 -0.58 -3.87 ** 
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Table 9. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: Grouped by Actual Fund Size 
 
This table shows mean returns of the Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio from 1995 to 2004.  The portfolios are grouped by the fund size of Actual 
Portfolio for every year.  Large Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the top of the year.  Small Size Group consists of actual funds 
whose fund size was at the bottom of the year.  Average Size Group consists of the rest of funds.  N is the total number of funds that are available during 
the given time period.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Performance of Copycat Portfolio is the weighted 
average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund.  
Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month treasury 
return.  Panel A describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed 
with 90-day delay by group.  Panel B describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio 
holdings are disclosed with 60-day delay by group.  Panel C describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio 
when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed with 30-day delay by group.  N represents the number of fund-quarters available. BHR[0,1] represents 
one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents 
three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences 
among groups are significant.  t-values and P-values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups. ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Fund Size    Panel A. 90-DAY DELAY Panel B. 60-DAY DELAY Panel C. 30-DAY DELAY 
Group Returns Actual Copycat Diff t-value   Actual Copycat Diff t-value   Actual Copycat Diff t-value   
Large BHR [0,1] 1.24 0.76 0.48 9.17 ** 0.55 0.26 0.29 3.85 ** -0.13 0.36 -0.49 -7.16 ** 
Size BHR [0,2] 1.25 1.42 -0.17 -1.97 ** 1.77 0.98 0.79 9.12 ** 0.44 0.65 -0.21 -2.05 ** 
 
BHR [0,3] 1.88 1.48 0.41 3.43 ** 1.76 1.61 0.14 1.38   1.60 1.31 0.29 2.64 ** 
Medium BHR [0,1] 1.43 0.84 0.59 9.05 ** 0.41 0.20 0.22 2.40 ** 0.05 0.58 -0.53 -6.56 ** 
Size BHR [0,2] 1.66 1.76 -0.09 -0.88   1.81 0.99 0.83 8.15 ** 0.48 0.80 -0.31 -2.46 ** 
  BHR [0,3] 2.34 1.92 0.42 3.02 ** 2.02 1.88 0.14 1.14   1.82 1.53 0.29 2.24 ** 
Small BHR [0,1] 1.54 0.91 0.63 7.43 ** 0.41 0.13 0.28 2.65 ** -0.01 0.62 -0.64 -5.65 ** 
Size BHR [0,2] 1.70 1.82 -0.12 -0.88   1.94 1.00 0.95 7.95 ** 0.40 0.78 -0.38 -2.30 ** 
  BHR [0,3] 2.34 2.00 0.34 1.94 ** 2.07 1.89 0.18 1.16   1.86 1.56 0.30 1.83 * 
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Table 10. Actual Returns – Copycat Returns: 90-day Delay vs. 30-day Delay 
 
In this table, we describe the performance differences in means between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio for 90-day delay case compared to the 
one for 30-day delay case.  Panel A shows mean of performance differences from 1995 to 2004.  In Panel B.1, the portfolios are grouped by the 
performance of Actual Portfolio for every year.  High Performance Group consists of actual funds who were top players of the year.  Low Performance 
Group consists of actual funds who were bottom players of the year.  Average Performance Group consists of the rest of funds.  In Panel B.2, the 
portfolios are grouped by the fund size of actual portfolio for every year.  Large Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the top of the 
year.  Small Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the bottom of the year.  Average Size Group consists of the rest of funds. N is the 
total number of funds that are available during the given time period.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  
Performance of Copycat Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP 
based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  
Cash returns are based on one-month treasury return. BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents 
two-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. We conduct t-test for 
means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values and P-values are associated with two-sided 
t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. 90 days delay vs. 30-day delay: All       
         90-day 30-day       
     Year Returns Delay Delay Diff t-value   
     All BHR [0,1] 0.56 -0.54 1.10 45.23 ** 
     
 
BHR [0,2] -0.13 -0.29 0.16 5.44 ** 
       BHR [0,3] 0.39 0.29 0.10 2.85 ** 
     
            Panel B. 90 days delay vs. 30-day delay: By Group       
    B.1. Performance Base Panel B.2. Fund size base 
    90-day 30-day       90-day 30-day       
Group Returns Delay Delay Diff t-value   Delay Delay Diff t-value   
High / Large BHR [0,1] 0.79 -0.27 1.06 27.33 ** 0.48 -0.49 0.97 29.90 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 0.34 0.18 0.16 3.52 ** -0.17 -0.21 0.05 1.21   
  BHR [0,3] 1.06 1.01 0.05 0.79   0.41 0.29 0.12 2.49 ** 
Average / Medium BHR [0,1] 0.54 -0.55 1.10 31.86 ** 0.59 -0.53 1.12 27.01 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] -0.14 -0.32 0.18 4.60 ** -0.09 -0.31 0.22 4.33 ** 
  BHR [0,3] 0.36 0.23 0.13 2.75 ** 0.42 0.29 0.13 2.23 ** 
Low / Small BHR [0,1] 0.28 -0.88 1.16 21.88 ** 0.63 -0.64 1.27 22.51 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] -0.72 -0.86 0.14 2.18 ** -0.12 -0.38 0.26 3.71 ** 
  BHR [0,3] -0.42 -0.58 0.16 2.15 ** 0.34 0.30 0.04 0.49   
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Table 11. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds – Summary 
 
This table shows the comparison of mean returns(BHR[0,1]) of the Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio 
from 1995 to 2004.  BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  In Panel A, the 
portfolios are grouped by the performance of Actual Portfolio for every year.  High Performance Group 
consists of actual funds who were top players of the year.  Low Performance Group consists of actual funds 
who were bottom players of the year.  Average Performance Group consists of the rest of funds.  Performance 
of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Performance of Copycat Portfolio is the weighted 
average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP based 
the holdings information of each fund Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, 
Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month treasury return.  In Panel B, the 
portfolios are grouped by the fund size of Actual Portfolio for every year.  Large Size Group consists of actual 
funds whose fund size was at the top of the year.  Small Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size 
was at the bottom of the year.  Average Size Group consists of the rest of funds.  We conduct t-test for means 
and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values and P-
values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Grouped by actual fund annual performance         
 Performance Group 90-DAY DELAY 60-DAY DELAY 30-DAY DELAY 
High performance Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Average performance Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Low performance Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat   Copycat > Actual ** 
       
Panel B. Grouped by actual fund size           
Size Group 90-DAY DELAY 60-DAY DELAY 30-DAY DELAY 
Large size Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Medium size Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Small size Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
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Appendix B. Tables & Figures with the LOWEST actual return for multiple-SECID 
 
Figure B.1. Actual funds vs. Copycat funds: 90/60/30-day delay 
 
This figure describes the difference in performance between the Actual Portfolio and the Copycat Portfolio. 
The Copycat Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio, disclosed with a delay of 90, 60, 
or 30 days after every quarter. Performance of the Actual Portfolio is retrieved from the Morningstar 
database. The Copycat Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings. 
Equity returns are calculated from CRSP based on the holdings information of each fund. Bond returns are 
based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (now, Barclays aggregate bond index) returns. Cash returns are 
based on one-month Treasury returns. Other returns are based on one-month Treasury returns. BHR[0,1] 
mean represents the average difference in one-month buy-and-hold returns after the disclosure between 
Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio.  BHR[0,1] median represents the median difference in one-month buy-
and-hold returns after the disclosure between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio.  The supporting data are 
from Table 5, Table 6 and Table7 
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Figure B.2. Actual funds vs. Copycat funds by Group: 90/60/30-day delay 
 
This figure describes the difference in returns between the Actual Portfolio and the Copycat Portfolio. This 
analysis uses the one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure, BHR[0,1]. The Copycat Portfolios 
created based on the holdings of the actual portfolio, disclosed with a delay of 90, 60, or 30 days after every 
quarter. In Panel A, the portfolios are grouped by the performance of actual portfolio for every year. The high-
performance group consists of actual funds that were top players of the year. The low-performance group 
consists of actual funds that were bottom players of the year. The medium-performance group consists of the 
rest of funds. In Panel B, the portfolios are grouped by the fund size of Actual Portfolio for every year. The 
large size group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the top of the year. The small size group 
consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the bottom of the year. The medium size group consists of the 
rest of funds. The supporting data are from Table 8 and Table 9. 
 
Panel A: Performance base 
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Table B.1. Actual funds vs. Copycat funds: 90-day delay 
 
This table describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio. The 
Copycat Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio which are disclosed with 90-day 
delay every quarter.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Copycat 
Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are 
calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are based on Lehman 
Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month 
treasury return.  Other returns are based on one-month treasury return BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-
and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the 
disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  N represents the 
number of fund-quarters available.  Panel A shows the mean and median of returns from 1995 to 2004.  Panel 
B shows the mean and median of returns for each year from 1995 to 2004.  We conduct t-test for means and 
wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values are 
associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  P-values are associated with 
wilcoxon test of no difference in median between two groups. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. All-90 days delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Year Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value 
 
Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]        10,434  1.30 1.47 0.82 0.97 0.47 12.47 ** 0.00 ** 
- BHR [0,2]        10,434  1.34 1.43 1.64 1.58 -0.29 -4.80 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,3]        10,434  1.91 2.78 1.76 2.27 0.15 1.78 * 0.00 ** 
Panel B. By year-90 days delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Year Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value   Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]             468  1.63 1.52 1.25 1.16 0.37 4.25 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             468  4.01 3.85 3.01 2.93 1.00 10.25 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             468  4.90 4.96 3.54 3.71 1.35 11.01 ** 0.00 ** 
1996 BHR [0,1]             586  2.19 2.24 1.78 1.70 0.41 3.22 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             586  6.47 6.39 5.09 5.07 1.38 7.32 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             586  7.35 7.39 5.68 5.68 1.67 7.26 ** 0.00 ** 
1997 BHR [0,1]             712  0.86 1.02 0.75 0.77 0.12 1.09   0.14   
 
BHR [0,2]             712  1.67 1.99 1.48 1.59 0.19 1.48   0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             712  5.13 5.44 3.72 3.85 1.41 7.66 ** 0.00 ** 
1998 BHR [0,1]             885  3.28 3.31 2.53 2.53 0.75 7.78 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             885  0.18 0.02 0.63 0.50 -0.46 -2.08 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             885  5.69 5.27 4.37 4.14 1.32 5.10 ** 0.00 ** 
1999 BHR [0,1]             992  -1.16 -1.03 -0.71 -0.60 -0.45 -4.31 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             992  -0.97 -1.08 -1.06 -1.02 0.09 0.44   0.57   
 
BHR [0,3]             992  2.86 2.01 2.10 1.57 0.76 2.65 ** 0.43   
2000 BHR [0,1]          1,160  2.37 2.28 3.09 2.76 -0.72 -5.00 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,160  -0.23 0.05 0.35 0.49 -0.57 -2.45 ** 0.03 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,160  -3.08 -3.22 -2.86 -2.79 -0.22 -0.75   0.46   
2001 BHR [0,1]          1,314  -1.50 -1.56 -1.10 -1.18 -0.40 -4.27 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,314  -1.74 -1.76 -0.95 -0.99 -0.79 -4.15 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,314  -4.26 -4.09 -3.16 -3.12 -1.10 -4.07 ** 0.00 ** 
2002 BHR [0,1]          1,381  1.72 1.43 1.88 1.66 -0.16 -1.54   0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,381  3.71 3.13 4.93 4.42 -1.22 -7.46 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,381  0.59 -0.33 2.11 1.07 -1.52 -7.66 ** 0.00 ** 
2003 BHR [0,1]          1,478  2.72 2.72 1.87 1.84 0.84 18.01 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,478  3.53 3.48 3.48 3.33 0.05 0.68   0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,478  4.20 4.29 4.53 4.49 -0.32 -4.50 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,1]          1,458  1.37 1.34 -1.78 -1.58 3.14 85.83 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,458  0.13 0.22 0.70 0.80 -0.57 -9.82 ** 0.00 ** 
  BHR [0,3]          1,458  2.69 2.70 1.83 1.79 0.86 11.66 ** 0.00 ** 
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Table B.2. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: 60-day Delay 
 
This table describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio. The 
Copycat Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio which are disclosed with 60-day 
delay every quarter.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Copycat 
Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are 
calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are based on Lehman 
Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month 
treasury return.  Other returns are based on one-month treasury return. BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-
and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the 
disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  N represents the 
number of fund-quarters available.  Panel A shows the mean and median of returns from 1995 to 2004.  Panel 
B shows the mean and median of returns for each year from 1995 to 2004.  We conduct t-test for means and 
wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values are 
associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  P-values are associated with 
wilcoxon test of no difference in median between two groups. ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. All-60 days delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Year Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value 
 
Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]        10,445  0.38 0.90 0.21 0.84 0.18 3.47 ** 0.00 ** 
- BHR [0,2]        10,445  1.66 2.52 0.98 1.18 0.68 11.63 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,3]        10,445  1.68 2.33 1.78 2.33 -0.10 -1.39   0.97   
Panel B. By year-60 days delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Year Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value   Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]             466  2.02 2.09 1.45 1.55 0.57 8.57 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             466  3.68 3.58 2.73 2.62 0.94 8.55 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             466  6.11 6.03 4.52 4.57 1.59 12.78 ** 0.00 ** 
1996 BHR [0,1]             583  -0.74 -0.30 -0.52 -0.16 -0.22 -2.02 ** 0.18   
 
BHR [0,2]             583  1.41 1.68 1.24 1.32 0.17 1.13   0.09 * 
 
BHR [0,3]             583  5.63 5.75 4.51 4.49 1.12 5.33 ** 0.00 ** 
1997 BHR [0,1]             711  3.88 3.83 2.62 2.65 1.26 19.40 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             711  4.76 4.78 3.39 3.36 1.38 12.96 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             711  5.55 5.81 4.11 4.20 1.44 12.40 ** 0.00 ** 
1998 BHR [0,1]             884  4.99 4.66 3.48 3.40 1.51 12.83 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             884  8.50 8.38 6.14 6.21 2.36 13.57 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             884  5.30 5.02 4.20 3.95 1.10 4.19 ** 0.00 ** 
1999 BHR [0,1]             992  4.37 4.26 3.77 3.62 0.60 4.47 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             992  3.05 3.12 2.97 3.02 0.08 0.56   0.30   
 
BHR [0,3]             992  3.33 2.89 2.65 2.48 0.68 2.74 ** 0.01 ** 
2000 BHR [0,1]          1,159  -1.82 -1.64 -1.61 -1.33 -0.21 -1.51   0.01 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,159  0.37 0.40 1.31 1.22 -0.95 -6.88 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,159  -2.02 -1.58 -1.25 -0.78 -0.77 -2.91 ** 0.00 ** 
2001 BHR [0,1]          1,314  -1.69 -1.55 -1.44 -1.36 -0.25 -2.12 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,314  -3.35 -3.27 -2.73 -2.79 -0.62 -6.33 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,314  -3.80 -3.56 -2.79 -2.56 -1.02 -6.98 ** 0.00 ** 
2002 BHR [0,1]          1,386  -5.36 -5.49 -4.62 -4.83 -0.74 -8.52 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,386  -3.65 -4.17 -2.77 -3.29 -0.88 -6.08 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,386  -1.73 -2.59 0.14 -0.81 -1.86 -9.92 ** 0.00 ** 
2003 BHR [0,1]          1,490  0.63 0.74 0.80 0.89 -0.17 -4.33 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,490  3.40 3.47 2.69 2.77 0.70 10.93 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,490  4.23 4.31 4.32 4.27 -0.09 -1.08   0.75   
2004 BHR [0,1]          1,460  1.91 1.91 1.41 1.34 0.50 15.02 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,460  3.33 3.27 -0.41 -0.34 3.73 74.33 ** 0.00 ** 
  BHR [0,3]          1,460  1.99 2.06 2.10 2.06 -0.11 -1.56   0.33   
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Table B.3. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: 30-day Delay 
 
This table describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio. The 
Copycat Portfolio is created based on the holdings of the Actual Portfolio which are disclosed with 30-day 
delay every quarter.  Performance of actual portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Copycat 
portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are 
calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are based on Lehman 
Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month 
treasury return.  Other returns are based on one-month treasury return BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-
and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the 
disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  N represents the 
number of fund-quarters available.  Panel A shows mean and median of returns from 1995 to 2004.  Panel B 
shows mean and median of returns for each year from 1995 to 2004.  We conduct t-test for means and 
wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values are 
associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  P-values are associated with 
wilcoxon test of no difference in median between two groups.  ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, 
and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. All-30 days delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Year Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value 
 
Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]        10,385  -0.12 0.02 0.50 1.07 -0.62 -12.71 ** 0.00 ** 
- BHR [0,2]        10,385  0.27 1.06 0.73 1.75 -0.46 -6.17 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,3]        10,385  1.49 2.20 1.45 1.76 0.04 0.53   0.01 ** 
Panel B. By year-30 days delay                 
  
Actual Portfolio Copycat Portfolio Difference 
Year Returns N Mean Median Mean Median Mean t-value   Median-Pvalue 
1995 BHR [0,1]             466  2.12 2.16 1.47 1.52 0.64 9.24 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             466  4.18 4.27 2.97 3.03 1.21 11.95 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             466  5.89 5.94 4.29 4.27 1.60 10.04 ** 0.00 ** 
1996 BHR [0,1]             582  2.49 2.71 1.79 1.85 0.71 6.53 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             582  1.77 2.35 1.29 1.58 0.49 2.89 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             582  4.00 4.57 3.09 3.35 0.91 4.33 ** 0.00 ** 
1997 BHR [0,1]             702  3.17 3.06 2.44 2.33 0.73 6.43 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             702  7.16 7.03 5.14 4.98 2.02 16.30 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             702  8.20 8.23 6.00 5.87 2.20 11.26 ** 0.00 ** 
1998 BHR [0,1]             877  -3.69 -3.74 -2.59 -2.59 -1.10 -7.31 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]             877  1.11 0.78 0.80 0.64 0.31 1.66 * 0.32   
 
BHR [0,3]             877  4.40 4.09 3.29 3.05 1.11 5.23 ** 0.00 ** 
1999 BHR [0,1]             979  0.36 -0.47 0.35 -0.25 0.01 0.05   0.08 * 
 
BHR [0,2]             979  4.70 4.03 4.14 3.40 0.56 2.35 ** 0.04 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]             979  3.30 2.72 3.28 2.72 0.02 0.10   0.44   
2000 BHR [0,1]          1,153  -3.90 -3.17 -3.06 -2.33 -0.84 -3.78 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,153  -5.63 -4.82 -4.61 -3.83 -1.02 -3.64 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,153  -3.81 -3.40 -2.02 -1.66 -1.79 -7.66 ** 0.00 ** 
2001 BHR [0,1]          1,311  -0.35 -0.09 -0.30 -0.07 -0.05 -0.42   1.00   
 
BHR [0,2]          1,311  -1.87 -1.53 -1.54 -1.28 -0.33 -1.75 * 0.01 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,311  -3.57 -3.22 -2.88 -2.66 -0.69 -3.95 ** 0.00 ** 
2002 BHR [0,1]          1,370  -0.41 -0.21 0.72 0.78 -1.13 -18.53 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,370  -5.93 -5.90 -4.02 -4.18 -1.90 -22.23 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,3]          1,370  -4.41 -4.62 -2.27 -2.74 -2.14 -16.19 ** 0.00 ** 
2003 BHR [0,1]          1,485  2.86 2.58 2.64 2.44 0.23 4.41 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,485  3.51 3.37 3.45 3.32 0.07 1.07   0.40   
 
BHR [0,3]          1,485  6.38 6.21 5.44 5.26 0.94 9.97 ** 0.00 ** 
2004 BHR [0,1]          1,460  -1.20 -0.95 1.88 1.85 -3.08 -69.66 ** 0.00 ** 
 
BHR [0,2]          1,460  0.76 0.99 3.31 3.23 -2.55 -38.97 ** 0.00 ** 
  BHR [0,3]          1,460  2.18 2.27 1.43 1.46 0.75 9.94 ** 0.00 ** 
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Table B.4. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: Grouped by Actual Fund Annual Performance 
 
This table shows mean returns of the Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio from 1995 to 2004.  The portfolios are grouped by the performance of Actual 
Portfolio for every year.  High Performance Group consists of actual funds who were top players of the year.  Low Performance Group consists of actual 
funds who were bottom players of the year.  Average Performance Group consists of the rest of funds.  N is the total number of funds that are available 
during the given time period.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Performance of Copycat Portfolio is the weighted 
average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund Bond 
returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month treasury 
return.  Panel A describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed 
with 90-day delay by group.  Panel B describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio 
holdings are disclosed with 60-day delay by group.  Panel C describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio 
when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed with 30-day delay by group.  N represents the number of fund-quarters available.  BHR[0,1] represents 
one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents 
three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences 
among groups are significant.  t-values and P-values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
    Panel A. 90-DAY DELAY Panel B. 60-DAY DELAY Panel C. 30-DAY DELAY 
Performance 
Group Returns Actual Copycat Diff t-value   Actual Copycat Diff t-value   Actual Copycat Diff t-value   
High 
performance BHR [0,1] 1.60 0.92 0.68 11.56 ** 1.18 0.86 0.33 4.00 ** 0.93 1.31 -0.38 -5.05 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 2.35 2.23 0.12 1.36   2.78 1.75 1.03 10.90 ** 2.14 2.20 -0.06 -0.51 
  BHR [0,3] 3.91 3.19 0.72 5.97 ** 3.50 3.04 0.46 4.39 ** 3.70 3.04 0.67 5.74 ** 
Average 
performance BHR [0,1] 1.28 0.80 0.47 8.16 ** 0.26 0.09 0.17 2.13 ** -0.17 0.45 -0.62 -9.19 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 1.34 1.62 -0.28 -3.04 ** 1.52 0.85 0.66 7.12 ** 0.10 0.56 -0.46 -4.22 ** 
 BHR [0,3] 1.74 1.59 0.16 1.30   1.56 1.65 -0.10 -0.91   1.30 1.27 0.03 0.25   
Low 
performance BHR [0,1] 0.94 0.73 0.22 2.63 ** -0.51 -0.49 -0.01 -0.12   -1.41 -0.47 -0.94 -8.79 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 0.06 0.90 -0.84 -6.09 ** 0.39 0.16 0.24 2.15 ** -1.95 -0.97 -0.98 -6.35 ** 
 BHR [0,3] -0.46 0.14 -0.60 -3.46 ** -0.51 0.31 -0.82 -5.46 ** -1.16 -0.40 -0.76 -5.08 ** 
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Table B.5. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds: Grouped by Actual Fund Size 
This table shows mean of returns of the Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio from 1995 to 2004.  The portfolios are grouped by the fund size of actual 
portfolio for every year.  Large Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the top of the year.  Small Size Group consists of actual funds 
whose fund size was at the bottom of the year.  Average Size Group consists of the rest of funds.  N is the total number of funds that are available during 
the given time period.  Performance of actual portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Performance of copycat portfolio is the weighted 
average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund.  
Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month treasury 
return.  Panel A describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed 
with 90-day delay by group.  Panel B describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio when the Actual Portfolio 
holdings are disclosed with 60-day delay by group.  Panel C describes the difference in performance between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio 
when the Actual Portfolio holdings are disclosed with 30-day delay by group.  N represents the number of fund-quarters available. BHR[0,1] represents 
one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents two-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents 
three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences 
among groups are significant.  t-values and P-values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  **, * indicate 
statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
Fund Size   Panel A. 90-DAY DELAY Panel B. 60-DAY DELAY Panel C. 30-DAY DELAY 
Group Returns Actual Copycat Diff t-value   Actual Copycat Diff t-value   Actual Copycat Diff t-value   
Large BHR [0,1] 1.13 0.76 0.38 7.13 ** 0.44 0.26 0.18 2.40 ** -0.23 0.36 -0.59 -8.66 ** 
Size BHR [0,2] 1.05 1.42 -0.38 -4.40 ** 1.55 0.98 0.58 6.62 ** 0.23 0.65 -0.42 -4.08 ** 
 
BHR [0,3] 1.56 1.48 0.09 0.75   1.44 1.61 -0.18 -1.68 * 1.28 1.31 -0.03 -0.27   
Medium BHR [0,1] 1.35 0.84 0.51 7.87 ** 0.34 0.20 0.14 1.59   -0.02 0.58 -0.60 -7.43 ** 
Size BHR [0,2] 1.52 1.76 -0.24 -2.25 ** 1.66 0.99 0.68 6.67 ** 0.34 0.80 -0.46 -3.60 ** 
  BHR [0,3] 2.12 1.92 0.20 1.44   1.80 1.88 -0.08 -0.66   1.60 1.53 0.07 0.53   
Small BHR [0,1] 1.48 0.91 0.57 6.71 ** 0.34 0.13 0.21 2.01 ** -0.07 0.62 -0.70 -6.18 ** 
Size BHR [0,2] 1.58 1.82 -0.24 -1.78 * 1.82 1.00 0.82 6.86 ** 0.27 0.78 -0.51 -3.07 ** 
  BHR [0,3] 2.17 2.00 0.16 0.93   1.88 1.89 -0.01 -0.08   1.67 1.56 0.11 0.66   
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Table B.6. Actual Returns – Copycat Returns: 90-day Delay vs. 30-day Delay 
 
In this table, we describe the performance differences in means between Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio for 90-day delay case compared to the 
one for 30-day delay case.  Panel A shows mean of performance differences from 1995 to 2004.  In Panel B.1, the portfolios are grouped by the 
performance of Actual Portfolio for every year.  High Performance Group consists of actual funds who were top players of the year.  Low Performance 
Group consists of actual funds who were bottom players of the year.  Average Performance Group consists of the rest of funds.  In Panel B.2, the 
portfolios are grouped by the fund size of actual portfolio for every year.  Large Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the top of the 
year.  Small Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the bottom of the year.  Average Size Group consists of the rest of funds. N is the 
total number of funds that are available during the given time period.  Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  
Performance of Copycat Portfolio is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated from CRSP 
based the holdings information of each fund.  Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  
Cash returns are based on one-month treasury return. BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  BHR[0,2] represents 
two-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. BHR[0,3] represents three-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure. We conduct t-test for 
means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among groups are significant.  t-values and P-values are associated with two-sided 
t-test of no difference in mean between two groups.  ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. 90 days delay vs. 30-day delay: All       
         90-day 30-day       
     Year Returns Delay Delay Diff t-value   
     1995 BHR [0,1] 0.47 -0.62 1.10 44.85 ** 
     to BHR [0,2] -0.29 -0.46 0.16 5.50 ** 
     2004 BHR [0,3] 0.15 0.04 0.11 2.93 ** 
     
            Panel B. 90 days delay vs. 30-day delay: By Group       
    B.1. Performance Base Panel B.2. Fund size base 
    90-day 30-day       90-day 30-day       
Group Returns Delay Delay Diff t-value   Delay Delay Diff t-value   
High / Large BHR [0,1] 0.68 -0.38 1.06 27.00 ** 0.38 -0.59 0.96 29.47 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] 0.12 -0.06 0.18 3.74 ** -0.38 -0.42 0.05 1.28   
  BHR [0,3] 0.72 0.67 0.06 0.91   0.09 -0.03 0.12 2.44 ** 
Average / Medium BHR [0,1] 0.47 -0.62 1.09 31.43 ** 0.51 -0.60 1.11 26.74 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] -0.28 -0.46 0.18 4.46 ** -0.24 -0.46 0.22 4.28 ** 
  BHR [0,3] 0.16 0.03 0.13 2.71 ** 0.20 0.07 0.13 2.22 ** 
Low / Small BHR [0,1] 0.22 -0.94 1.16 21.75 ** 0.57 -0.70 1.27 22.46 ** 
 
BHR [0,2] -0.84 -0.98 0.14 2.10 ** -0.24 -0.51 0.27 3.78 ** 
  BHR [0,3] -0.60 -0.76 0.16 2.12 ** 0.16 0.11 0.05 0.64   
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Table B.7. Actual Funds vs. Copycat Funds – Summary 
 
This table shows the comparison of mean returns(BHR[0,1]) of the Actual Portfolio and Copycat Portfolio 
from 1995 to 2004.  BHR[0,1] represents one-month buy-and-hold return after the disclosure.  In Panel A, 
the portfolios are grouped by the performance of Actual Portfolio for every year.  High Performance Group 
consists of actual funds who were top players of the year.  Low Performance Group consists of actual 
funds who were bottom players of the year.  Average Performance Group consists of the rest of funds.  
Performance of Actual Portfolio is retrieved from Morningstar database.  Performance of Copycat Portfolio 
is the weighted average of returns of equity, bond, cash, and other holdings.  Equity returns are calculated 
from CRSP based the holdings information of each fund Bond returns are based on Lehman Aggregate 
bond index (Now, Barclays aggregate bond index) return.  Cash returns are based on one-month treasury 
return.  In Panel B, the portfolios are grouped by the fund size of Actual Portfolio for every year.  Large 
Size Group consists of actual funds whose fund size was at the top of the year.  Small Size Group consists of 
actual funds whose fund size was at the bottom of the year.  Average Size Group consists of the rest of 
funds.  We conduct t-test for means and wilcoxon-tests for medians in order to see the differences among 
groups are significant.  t-values and P-values are associated with two-sided t-test of no difference in mean 
between two groups.  ** and * indicate statistical significance at 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Panel A. Grouped by actual fund annual performance         
 Performance Group 90-DAY DELAY 60-DAY DELAY 30-DAY DELAY 
High performance Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Average performance Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Low performance Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual   Copycat > Actual ** 
       
Panel B. Grouped by actual fund size           
Size Group 90-DAY DELAY 60-DAY DELAY 30-DAY DELAY 
Large size Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Medium size Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
Small size Actual > Copycat ** Actual > Copycat ** Copycat > Actual ** 
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Appendix C: LIST OF COMMENTERS  
 
Funds/Investment Advisers/Financial Advisers  
1.  AIM Advisors, Inc.  AIM  
2.  American Century Investment Management, Inc.  
American 
Century  
3.  Capital Research & Management Co  Capital Research  
4.  Charles Schwab  Schwab  
5.  Fidelity Investments  Fidelity  
6.  TIAA-CREF  TIAA-CREF  
7.  The Vanguard Group  Vanguard  
 
Professional and Trade Associations  
1.  The Financial Planning Association  FPA  
2.  Investment Company Institute I  ICI-I  
3.  Investment Company Institute II  ICI-II  
4.  Securities Industry Association  SIA  
5.  
American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants  
AICPA  
 
Bar Associations/Accounting Firms/Consultants/Academics  
1.  
American Bar Association, Section of Business 
Law  
ABA  
2.  AMG Data Services  AMG  
3.  Buyside Research  Buyside  
4.  Computershare Analytics  Computershare  
5.  KPMG  KPMG  
6.  Morningstar  Morningstar  
7.  PriceWaterhouseCoopers  PWC  
8.  Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee  Shadow  
9.  Stocksnfund.com  Stocksnfund  
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Investor and Other Groups  
1.  AFL-CIO  AFL-CIO  
2.  Council of Institutional Investors  CII  
3.  
Fund Democracy/Consumer Federation of 
America  
Fund Democracy  
4.  SIPA Advisory Committee  SIPA  
 
Individual Investors  
1.  Laurance Arnold  Arnold  
2.  Susanne Bradford  Bradford  
3.  Allen Chandler  Chandler  
4.  Clifden1A  Clifden1A  
5.  John Cochran  Cochran  
6.  Rich Coyle  Coyle  
7.  James G. Curtis  Curtis  
8.  Tim Dillon  Dillon  
9.  John E. Donaldson, Jr.  Donaldson  
10.  Geoffrey F. Foisie  Foisie  
11.  Thomas Fowler  Fowler  
12.  Andy Freeman  Freeman  
13.  Barbara Fritz  Fritz  
14.  Daniel Hayhurst  Hayhurst  
15.  Larry Herold  Herold  
16.  Dan Jamieson  Jamieson  
17.  Lewis D. Junior  Junior  
18.  Ken Kessler  Kessler  
19.  Anil Khubchandani  Khubchandani  
20.  Jason Kreher  Kreher  
21.  Hans Lange  Lange  
22.  Martin N. Levine  Levine  
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23.  Harriett Magee  Magee  
24.  William Malahy  Malahy  
25.  John Pasqua  Pasqua  
26.  Wendell G. Peart  Peart  
27.  Erich Riesenberg  Riesenberg  
28.  Thomas Rigo  Rigo  
29.  Peter Ryan 1  Ryan 1  
30.  Peter Ryan 2  Ryan 2  
31.  William St. John  St. John  
32.  Mike Savage  Savage  
33.  Donald S. Schofield  Schofield  
34.  David Singh  Singh  
35.  Michael J. Stifter  Stifter  
36.  RStone1  RStone 1  
37.  John Turner  Turner  
38.  Joseph Welch  Welch  
39.  Jim & Cecelia Woods  Woods  
40.  Rachel Young  Young  
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